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ABSTRACT
A Study of Reconfigurable Antennas as a Solution for Efficiency, Robustness,
and Security of Wireless Systems
Rashid Mehmood
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, BYU
Doctor of Philosophy
The reconfigurable aperture (RECAP) is a reconfigurable antenna consisting of a
dense array of electronically controlled elements, which can be manipulated to support many
antenna functions within a single architecture. RECAPs are explored herein as an enabling
technology for future software defined and cognitive radio architectures, as well as compact
wireless devices supporting many bands and services.
First, the concept of a parasitic RECAP is developed and analyzed for various communication applications. This begins with the analysis of existing RECAP topologies (e.g.
planar and parasitic) using a hybrid method combining full wave simulations and network
analysis. Next, a performance versus complexity analysis is performed to assess the use
of a parasitic RECAP for the most critical communications functions: pattern synthesis,
MIMO communications and physical-layer wireless security. To verify simulation results, a
prototype parasitic RECAP is also built and deployed in real propagation environments.
Given the potential of adaptive and reconfigurable architectures for providing enhanced security, an idealized reconfigurable antenna is analyzed, resulting in the concept of
secure array synthesis. The objective is to find optimal array beamforming for secure communication in the presence of a passive eavesdropper in a static line-of-sight (LOS) channel.
The method is then extended to the case of multipath propagation environments. The problem is solved by casting it into the form of a semi-definite program, which can be solved
with convex optimization. The method is general and can be applied to an arbitrary array topology with or without antenna mutual-coupling. Due to complexity of the problem,
initial attention has been restricted to idealized reconfigurable antennas (smart antennas),
where excitation amplitude and phase at each element can be controlled independently.
Lastly, reconfigurable antennas are investigated as a solution to support the emerging application of over-the-air (OTA) testing in a low-cost and compact way, resulting in
the concept of the reconfigurable over-the-air chamber (ROTAC). First, an idealized twodimensional ROTAC is analyzed, revealing that the fading distribution, spatial correlation,
frequency selectivity, and multipath angular spectrum can be controlled by proper specification of the random loads. Later, a prototype of ROTAC is built to study the fading statistics
and angular characteristics of the multipath fields inside a practical chamber.

Keywords: Reconfigurable antennas, RECAP, OTA testing, MIMO Communications, physical layer security, secure pattern synthesis, ROTAC, ERRC
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Traditional wireless systems employ a single antenna and have little or no control over
how the channel is exploited for physical transmission. Antenna systems and algorithms that
can effectively adapt their operation to changing needs and environmental conditions have
been the subject of intense research over the past few decades. The need of such architectures
has been especially apparent in the realm of wireless communications, due to a dramatic rise
in services, applications, and users coupled with the scarcity and high cost of radio-frequency
(RF) spectrum.
Smart antennas represent the most adaptive solution, where physical antenna elements are simple transducers whose signals are digitized and jointly processed by powerful
digital signal processing (DSP) architectures. Smart antennas can support diversity, beamforming, interference suppression, and spatial multiplexing, thus maximizing user performance for the channels and conditions that are present. Although smart antennas are a
very powerful concept, the cost associated with the multiple RF chains and additional DSP
resources can limit their use in many practical applications.
In contrast, reconfigurable antennas represent an alternative approach, where the antennas are physically adapted to maximize signal power. These solutions potentially provide
a smaller, lower cost, and lower power solution than digital beamforming techniques. Not
only do analog reconfigurable architectures support traditional applications such as beam
steering [1], pattern null creation [2], and frequency agility [3], but they also enable future software defined and cognitive radio architectures, compact wireless devices supporting
many bands and services, spectrally efficient communication, and secure transmission at a
potentially lower cost than smart antennas.
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Antennas with a much higher degree of reconfigurability that consist of a dense two or
three-dimensional array of reconfigurable elements (REs) whose states can be electronically
controlled have been referred to as reconfigurable aperture (RECAP) antennas [4], [5]. The
goals of the RECAP are similar to those of reconfigurable antennas and switched parasitic
arrays, namely to support multiple frequency bands as well as dynamic pattern synthesis
in a single aperture. When the degree of reconfigurability of the RECAP is large and
loss of the REs sufficiently low, RECAPs have the potential to dynamically synthesize a
wide range of antennas, constrained only by the physical aperture of the device. RECAPs
have demonstrated the ability to support multiple bands [6], beamforming [7], and gain
and impedance optimization [8]. This discussion uses the words RECAP and reconfigurable
antenna interchangeably to refer to antennas with a high degree of complexity in terms of
number of reconfigurable elements (NRE ) and number of reconfigurable states (NRS ) per
element.
This dissertation explores the use of reconfigurable antennas and RECAPs for a variety of applications related to wireless communication, physical layer security, and over-the-air
(OTA) testing of mobile devices. The new contributions in each of these areas are listed in
the following section.
1.1

New Contributions
• An important goal of this research is to characterize the level of RECAP complexity
required to achieve near-optimal performance for different communication applications.
Previously, both planar and parasitic RECAPs for beamforming [9, 10] and interference
suppression were investigated [11]. The work in this dissertation analyzes the parasitic
RECAP with multiple feeds for multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wireless channel capacity enhancement using different power constraints, a realistic noise model and
varying degree of RECAP complexity [12]. As part of this study, a prototype parasitic
RECAP was also built and MIMO capacity measurements were performed to support
the theoretical results [13].
• Physical layer security methods have been proposed that use the time-varying wireless
propagation channel between two nodes to establish secret keys. If an eavesdropper
2

(Eve) is not located close to one of the nodes, then most of the generated key bits are
secure and can be used for encryption purposes. However, this technique has limitations
for the case of static or line-of-sight (LOS) channels. In this case, random time variation
of an effective propagation channel can be created by a randomly controlling a RECAP,
thus restoring the ability to generate keys in LOS, static environments. Although this
concept was demonstrated in [14], questions remained about the security of the method
with respect to an eavesdropper as well as the required complexity of the reconfigurable
antenna to provide peak performance of secure key establishment. These issues are
studied in detail in this dissertation. Specifically, the role of reconfigurable antenna
complexity for key establishment is analyzed using both simulations and measurements,
for the case of a highly equipped eavesdropper surrounding the reconfigurable antenna
[15].
• A new array synthesis objective is proposed for physical layer security, whose goal is
to maximize secure information shared with a legitimate recipient in the presence of
a passive eavesdropper for line-of-sight wireless transmission. By casting the problem
into the form of a semi-definite program, it is found that the problem is convex and
that optimal solutions can be efficiently found irrespective of the array topology. Furthermore, it is shown that radiated power of the optimal solution can be naturally
decomposed into a signal pattern and noise pattern, providing an intuitive description
of the optimal solutions and allowing comparison with standard array synthesis techniques. The analysis is further extended to multipath propagation channels, where the
expected value of the security metrics is optimized.
• Although the concept of OTA testing has been established, it is a very complex
and costly technology. This dissertation proposes the novel concept of the reconfigurable over-the-air chamber (ROTAC) that consists of a traditional reverberation
chamber whose walls are lined with REs. This work explores the potential of the
concept through simulation and proof-of-concept implementation. Simulations of twodimensional chamber reveals that fading distribution, spatial correlation, frequency
selectivity, and directional channel response can be controlled to generate useful syn3

thetic propagation channels [16]. Later an 11 × 11 inch prototype of ROTAC is built
to demonstrate the practical implementation as well as the limitations associated with
proposed scheme.
1.2

Organization of the Dissertation
To provide context for the ideas presented in this dissertation, Chapter 2 covers the

background material on RECAPs, simulations and optimization strategies, and explores
practical issues like losses and phase tunability. Furthermore, related background work on
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) communications and wireless security is presented.
Chapter 3 analyzes the capacity of MIMO systems employing RECAPs with a realistic
thermal noise model for three different power constraints: average receive signal-to-noise
ratio (SNR), maximum effective isotropic radiated power (EIRP), and average transmit
power. Performance is studied not only for a noise-limited single link, but also in the
presence of interference and multiple RECAP-equipped users. The impact of loss and finite
bandwidth on the operation of the RECAP is also considered. The simulations are followed
by a measurement campaign in line-of-sight (LOS) and non-LOS conditions in an indoor
environment.
Chapter 4 explores the use of reconfigurable antennas to create channel randomness
for secret key establishment in slow-varying and LOS propagation environments. The goal
is to characterize the impact of reconfigurable antenna complexity on the performance of
key establishment in the presence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper. To validate simulations, a 3-node measurement campaign is performed which analyzes the practical aspects of
reconfigurable antennas associated with secure key establishment.
Chapter 5 focuses on the problem of optimizing an ideal reconfigurable antenna to
provide peak physical layer security. The secure transmission problem is posed in a form
analogous to that of conventional array synthesis, but in which information theoretic secrecy
metrics are constrained as a function of eavesdropper angle or position as opposed to constraining radiated power as a function of transmission angle. The resulting methodology is
referred to as secure array synthesis.
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In chapter 6 attention is shifted to over-the-air (OTA) testing, and the idea of a
reconfigurable over the air chamber (ROTAC) is proposed, whose purpose is to support OTA
testing in a compact and cost-effective fashion. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of
the proposed method, a prototype of ROTAC is built and its performance is investigated for
generating arbitrary field statistics on a device under test (DUT).
Conclusions and a discussion of future work are given in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter presents effective design techniques as well as efficient simulation and
optimization strategies for reconfigurable antennas. Prior work on reconfigurable antennas
for various communication applications is also discussed briefly.
2.1

Reconfigurable Antennas
Original ideas behind reconfigurable antennas date back to the work by Harrington

[17] who studied reactively controlled directive arrays. Since then, work on reconfigurable
antennas has referred to these adaptive antenna elements as switched parasitic elements,
reconfigurable apertures [5], evolutionary antennas [18], and self-structuring antennas [19],
with the different words sometimes having slight differences in meaning but the basic antenna structures having similar goals. Reconfigurability is generally attained by integrating
semiconductor switches, such as PIN diodes or FETs, MEMS switches, liquid crystals, or
tunable reactances such as varactor diodes inside the antenna.
The switched parasitic array, introduced in [17], is one example of a reconfigurable
antenna. In this architecture, one or relatively few elements are connected to active RF
circuitry, while the bulk of the antennas are connected to switched reactive loads having
two possible states. By changing the state of the loads, the effective pattern of the array
is altered. For closely-spaced antenna elements exhibiting mutual coupling, the state of the
switched parasitic loads also modifies the active antenna impedance. Prior studies have
used reconfigurable antennas extensively to evaluate their performance in beamforming [5],
interference suppression [20], supporting multiple frequencies and polarizations.
Although it is completely expected that diminishing returns with increasing RECAP
complexity in terms of the number of reconfigurable elements (NRE ) and number of recon6

Figure 2.1: Perspective view of the parasitic RECAP with feed in the middle and other
elements are REs

figurable states (NRS ) will be experienced as the performance limit is approached, the level
of complexity required to achieve the majority of the performance benefit has not been previously explored. Also, for a limited level of complexity (which might be dictated by an
application), it is interesting to study the loss in performance compared to what might be
achieved using the optimal solution. Finally, it is of interest to understand whether complexity in the number or type of elements is more important for maximizing complexity-limited
performance. Research on these issues is the focus of this dissertation. Important practical
issues like bandwidth, component tolerance, and loss, are also considered.
2.1.1

RECAP Design
Although many different RECAP architectures can be studied, attention is restricted

to two specific architectures or topologies in this dissertation. The first one consists of a
square array of half-wave dipole antennas occupying an area of 1λ × 1λ in the xy plane and
height λ/2 in z as shown in Figure 2.1, where one or more elements serve as feeds and the
others are terminated with reconfigurable loads and act as REs. The number of REs can
vary in the structure, where each RE can have NRS reconfigurable states (RSs). Ideally,
REs can be assumed to be either switches or variable reactances, such that the reflection
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Figure 2.2: Perspective view of the planar RECAP with NE = 4 logical elements, NRE = 3
reconfigurable elements (RE) and one feed (F).

coefficient presented at the kth port is Γk = ejαk , where αk ∈ [−180◦ , 180◦ ]. However in a
practical antenna, losses will be associated with a fabricated REs.
The second reconfigurable aperture considered is a planar RECAP consisting of nonresonant (electrically small) patches connected by switches or variable reactances. Figure 2.2
shows a prototype of an 8 × 8 planar patch array structure constrained to a 1λ × 1λ area.
The structure consists of circular patches connected to each other using transmission lines.
Patches have a radius of 0.038λ and are interconnected with transmission lines having length
of 0.056λ and width of 0.015λ. Note that unlike normal patch antennas that are approximately λ/2 and have a ground plane underneath, this structure is just a single plane with
individual patches that are small compared to the operational wavelength. The differential
feed used in this case is approximately in the middle of the structure and is marked as ‘F’
in Figure 2.2, where NE represents number of logical elements. Note that although a planar RECAP was analyzed in the author’s past work [9, 21], this dissertation focuses on the
parasitic dipole RECAP explained above.
2.1.2

Hybrid Full-Wave/Network Analysis of RECAP Antennas
Full-wave simulation of RECAP antennas for all required configurations of the REs

is computationally expensive, since many thousands of trials are typically required. Therefore an efficient simulation method is adopted that consists of full-wave simulation of the
unterminated array combined with network analysis to find impedance or S-parameter char-
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Figure 2.3: Characterization of a generic RECAP antenna

acteristics and radiation patterns for arbitrary termination impedances. This hybrid method
has been proven to be exact assuming fairly standard assumptions [22].
Figure 2.3 depicts a generic RECAP antenna consisting of a single active feed port
(Port 1) and additional ports that are terminated with reconfigurable reactances (Ports 2-N ).
A complete characterization of the antenna is possible by running N full-wave simulations,
where for the kth simulation, a source is used to excite the kth port and other ports are
terminated with a convenient load. For this work, we apply a unit voltage excitation at
the kth port and terminate all other ports in a short-circuit. We then use the Numerical
Electromagnetics Code (NEC) to compute the embedded radiation pattern esc
k (θ, φ) as well
as the currents at all N ports (note that we use a custom finite-difference time-domain code
[23] for the computation of the planar RECAP). After all N simulations, we have the vector
esc (θ, φ) with kth element esc
k (θ, φ) and can easily construct the admittance matrix Y. As
we use S-parameter analysis in this thesis, we can compute the S-parameters using
S = (I + Z0 Y)−1 (I − Z0 Y),
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(2.1)

where I is the identity matrix, and Z0 is the system impedance. The radiation patterns with
all non-excited ports terminated in the system impedance can be computed using
1
emc (θ, φ) = √ esc (θ, φ)Y−1 (I − S).
Z0

(2.2)

Since this work considers dipole antennas, computations use Z0 = 72 Ω, which is close to
the dipole self-impedance.
To compute the antenna characteristics for arbitrary loading of the RE ports, the
general formulation begins with
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where a and b respectively represent vectors of incident and reflected waves at a set of ports.
The quantities aF and bF are NF × 1 vectors at the feed ports, aR and bR are NRE × 1 vectors
at the parasitic RE ports, and S has been appropriately partitioned. Terminating the kth
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where ΓF is the NF × NF reflection coefficient matrix looking into RECAP feed ports for
the RE termination ΓR . The embedded radiation patterns of the RECAP’s feed antennas
(emc (θ, φ)) given the RE termination are computed using
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(θ,φ)

(2.6)

(a) Vbias

(b)
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Figure 2.4: RE circuit: (a) schematic, (b) completed RE with circuit board holding components, bias lead, and a monopole inserted into the SMA connector.

mc
mc
where emc
F (θ, φ) and eRE (θ, φ) represent the portions of e (θ, φ) corresponding to the feed

antennas and the REs, respectively.
2.1.3

Prototype of a Parasitic RECAP
Although planar RECAPs are more easily fabricated than parasitic RECAPs, an

experimental parasitic RECAP was developed in this research due to its simple design. It
consists of a 5 × 5 array of parasitic monopole antennas confined to a 1λ × 1λ aperture over
a finite ground plane.
Figure 2.4 shows the design of the varactor-diode-based RE used in the prototype
RECAP. The tuning voltage Vbias is supplied by an FPGA-controlled circuit that generates
a uniformly-quantized bias voltage to each RE for each RE state. The tuning circuitry
is fabricated on the lower side of the small printed circuit board at the base of the SMA
connector. Figure 2.5 plots the corresponding magnitude and phase of S11 measured for
several different REs at 2.54 GHz using a Rohde & Schwarz VNB20 vector network analyzer.
S11 is measured at the input of the SMA connector when the monopole antenna is not
attached as depicted in Figure 2.4(a). The results show that the REs provide a phase
tunability of approximately 200◦ over 0 ≤ Vbias ≤ 5 V and that the loss (as manifest through
|S11 |) tends to increase with bias voltage. The impedance mismatch loss contribution can be
reduced by increasing the value of the series inductance in the circuit, but testing indicated
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Figure 2.5: Reflection coefficient of several REs as a function of the bias voltage (Vbias ).

that this leads to reduced phase tunability. Since the variation of phase is not significant for
Vbias < 1 V, the range 1 ≤ Vbias ≤ 5 V has been quantized uniformly into NRS reconfigurable
states in this work.
2.1.4

Optimization of RECAP
Due to the complicated relationship of RECAP operation on the state of the REs,

finding the set of REs to achieve the required performance goal is a non-convex optimization,
requiring some kind of global search. Although an exhaustive search would find the optimal
solution, even with the hybrid simulation strategy the computational burden is too high for
moderate and large values of NRE and NRS .
Global optimization algorithm, such as simulated annealing, ant-colony optimization
(ACO), particle swarm optimization (PSO), and genetic algorithms (GAs) are typically
employed for RECAP optimization [24]. A GA was used herein to optimize the states of the
RECAP, where a detailed implementation of GA is provided in [9]. Because the purpose of
this work was not to optimize the genetic algorithm, but rather to use it as a tool to study
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the performance benefit with increasing complexity, it is likely that other search methods
would lead to very similar conclusions.
Note that global search algorithms may be too expensive for real time optimization,
due to the extensive training overhead and computation time required. Some initial work
on real time optimization of a parasitic RECAP has been published in [25, 26], which combines direct optimization of a reduced-order reflection model of the RECAP with efficient
Newton-based root optimization for beamforming and null steering applications. However,
the development of direct RECAP optimization methods that are more suitable for real-time
optimization is still largely an open question.
2.2

RECAP for Pattern Synthesis and MIMO Communications
Although RECAPs with limited complexity had previously been used for pattern

synthesis, this author’s work was the first to investigate the fundamental dependence of
performance and complexity in RECAPs for beamforming and interference suppression applications [9–11, 21]. This analysis revealed that performance in terms of beamforming and
interference suppression saturates for approximately eight REs per wavelength, which is similar to the minimum sampling required to sufficiently capture the degrees of freedom of fields
in numerical electromagnetic solvers [10]. Additionally, it was found that performance saturates between NRS = 4 and 8 states, suggesting that having many simple REs (where the
aperture is better sampled) is more important than having fewer REs with more possible
states. Finally, it was observed that even in the region of saturated performance, added
complexity can be beneficial in terms of the convergence rate of the optimization algorithm,
indicating that higher complexity may be favorable for real-time implementation of RECAP
architectures [9].
RECAPs are also interesting for MIMO systems, where the optimal antenna array
best exploits the multi-path to provide peak capacity while using as few active RF chains as
possible. Also, for multi-user systems RECAPs can adapt patterns to dynamically partition
spatial reuse of spectral resources. To place the work in this dissertation in the proper context, it is worthwhile to review existing work. A practical antenna solution providing multiple
patterns with a single fixed antenna is presented in [27], exhibiting improved performance
13

compared to spatially separated dipoles. Capacity maximization using planar RECAPs at
transmit and receive is investigated in [28], where each antenna acts as a single RECAP. A
reconfigurable MIMO array consisting of two dipole elements is introduced in [29], where by
adaptively changing the length of the dipoles, modest increases in single user capacity are
possible. The study in [30] shows that MIMO systems with reconfigurable antennas have a
maximum diversity order equal to the product of the number of transmit antennas, receive
antennas, and the reconfigurable states. This idea is expanded in [31], where not only practical space-time coding methods that code over the antenna state to maximize diversity are
developed, but also practical aspects like antenna switching time are considered.
This previous work on reconfigurable MIMO systems has some limitations. First,
only simple termination-independent receiver noise was considered, which is known to be
inaccurate for analyzing MIMO systems with variable termination [32]. Second, limited
reconfigurability was considered, which may be insufficient to exploit the degrees of freedom
of the occupied aperture. Third, the role of the power constraint has not been studied in
detail, as typically only an average transmit power constraint has been assumed. Finally,
capacity maximization for a single link limited by thermal noise has been considered, but
multi-user systems with interference are more realistic for todays wireless scenarios. The
work in this dissertation provides a more comprehensive analysis of the capacity enhancement
possible with reconfigurable antennas by addressing these previous shortcomings [12, 13, 33].
It is important to mention that apart from the performance versus complexity analysis, most
of the simulation-based work on MIMO capacity using RECAPs was also presented in this
author’s Masters Thesis in 2010 [34]. However, this material is included in this dissertation
for the sake of completeness, allowing comparison with the results from the measurement
campaign conducted later in 2012.
2.3

RECAPs for Physical Layer Security
Security is a vital consideration for today’s wireless communications systems, and

there is growing interest in physical layer security methods that exploit the antennas and
propagation channel to provide an additional layer of protection over existing cryptographic
techniques. One such method involves generating secret keys from random reciprocal channel
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fluctuations [35, 36], allowing keys to be automatically generated at two nodes without the
need for secret information to be shared a priori. This technique is referred to as reciprocal
channel key generation (RCKG). As shown in [35], very long keys can be generated rapidly for
fading, non line-of-sight (NLOS) channels that exhibit Gaussian statistics and low temporal
correlation of channel observations. However, such methods are hindered by channels with
high spatial and temporal correlation, like line-of-sight (LOS) and static channels.
The ability to improve security by creating a time-varying effective channel with reconfigurable parasitic arrays was introduced in [37], allowing RCKG to be applied to both
LOS and static channels. Although this represents a very encouraging solution in quasi-static
situations, several outstanding questions regarding this technique remain. First, exploiting
artificially induced channel variation may not be as secure as exploiting fading that occurs
naturally, and while it is expected that channel richness and the antenna complexity play a
crucial role in the level of security, the sensitivity to these parameters is unclear. Second,
the distribution of random channels created by reconfigurable antennas is unknown. Ideally,
the variation should be made Gaussian, and it is of interest to see if careful system design
can achieve this. In the case that the variations cannot be made Gaussian, performance
evaluation needs to be assessed through development of a numerical algorithm for computing the key rate. Finally, the security of these methods in the presence of a very capable
eavesdropper needs to be investigated, such as when the RECAP is surrounded by eavesdropper antennas. This dissertation shows extensive analysis employing both simulations
and measurements to answer these outstanding questions [15, 38, 39].
These investigations regarding the use of RECAPs in physical layer security raise the
question of how an adaptive or reconfigurable array can be optimally controlled to maximize
the secure key generation rate, since previously RE control was done in an ad-hoc way. This
led to the new concept of secure array synthesis, which jointly synthesizes signal and noise
patterns to maximize security metrics with respect to an unknown eavesdropper position.
Work detailed in subsequent chapters highlights these developments..
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Chapter 3
MIMO Capacity Enhancement using Reconfigurable Antennas
Reliable and high performance transmission continues to be a major goal of wireless
communication systems, which is significantly enhanced by arrays employing beamforming and diversity techniques. Multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wireless technology
emerged in the 1980’s and has gained increasing attention due to the significant gains in
channel capacity [40, 41] made possible by exploiting channel multipath with spatial multiplexing. In a communication system, the channel matrix includes effects of the physical
propagation environment and antenna radiation and reception characteristics. Antennas can
be viewed as transmit and receive filters that are ideally matched to the physical channel,
enhancing signals of interest and mitigating noise and interference to maximize capacity [42].
Although for a single fixed antenna, no adaptation of spatial filtering is possible, reconfigurable antennas can be optimized to exploit the multipath propagation environment.
This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of capacity enhancement possible
with reconfigurable antennas using simulations and measurements. First, a parasitic RECAP
consisting of a 9×9 array having sufficient complexity to exploit a compact 1λ×1λ aperture
is studied with simulation. In contrast to [28], the complete aperture is exploited rather
than using separate RECAPs for each MIMO antenna. A realistic noise model is considered
in order to take into account the effect of matching on amplifier noise. Three realistic but
distinct power constraints are also considered, indicating where RECAPs are most effective:
1) average signal-to-noise (SNR), where transmit and receive power are normalized and the
focus of optimization is on channel orthogonality and multipath enhancement, 2) effective
isotropic radiated power (EIRP), which allows power enhancement at the receiver but not
at the transmitter, which is more practical for many of today’s communication systems,
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and 3) average transmit power, which is a commonly assumed constraint allowing power
enhancement at both transmit and receive.
In addition to considering a single link limited by thermal noise, fixed interference
and multiple RECAP-equipped links are also considered. Furthermore, a complexity versus
performance analysis is performed, highlighting the diminishing returns with an increase in
complexity of the RECAP for MIMO capacity.
The simulation work is extended by performing actual channel measurements with
a prototype RECAP. Measurements with one of the communicating nodes equipped with a
5×5 square parasitic RECAP confirm that several fold capacity increase is possible compared
to fixed (non-RECAP) MIMO systems.
3.1

Analysis of Parasitic RECAP Structure
The structure considered in this study is depicted in Figure 3.1(a), which is a 9×9

dipole array consisting of z-oriented half-wave dipoles constrained to an area of 1λ×1λ in
the xy plane. Each dipole is either an active “feed” (connected to a transmit or a receive
chain) or terminated with a reconfigurable element (RE), each of which has NRS possible
reconfigurable states (RSs) to ensure sufficient control over the aperture [10]. The top view
of the structure is shown in Figure 3.1(b), where REs and feeds are indicated by squares and
circles, respectively. In this work, the propagation is considered in the xy plane, where the
two-dimensional array can generate patterns with both endfire and broadside characteristics.
The complexity of the RECAP structure depends first on the number of reconfigurable
elements since this defines how many digital (for switched loads) or analog (for variable
reactances) outputs must be controlled. Second, complexity is also a function of the number
of reconfigurable states that each of the REs can assume, where the number of reconfigurable
bits NRB = log2 NRS is used to conveniently define the complexity of the RE states. The
NRE
total number of states for the complete RECAP is NTRS = NRS
= 2NRB NRE , and the

total RECAP complexity is defined as NRB NRE , representing the number of bits required to
configure all REs.
For performance versus complexity analysis, the number of REs is varied by always
having all 81 antennas present, but only terminating NRE of the antennas with a recon17

Figure 3.1: Configurations for non-RECAP and RECAP arrays: (a) Perspective view of the
parasitic RECAP with 2 feeds. (b) Top view of RECAP configurations, where red boxes show
RE positions, blue stars and circles show feed locations for 2×2 and 4×4 MIMO respectively.
(c) Top view of antenna positions for non-RECAP for 2×2 MIMO (stars) and 4×4 MIMO
(circles), where boxes are empty locations.

figurable element. Having the full array of dipoles present (even when only a subset is
terminated) was chosen to reduce the number of full-wave simulations and to avoid small
performance differences due to a changing array structure that might overshadow the effects
of RE complexity. The set of terminated antennas was chosen to try to maximize the distance between REs, thus sampling the aperture as efficiently as possible. Configurations for
values of NRE ranging from 4 to 79, when RECAP has two feed elements are depicted in
Figure 3.2. REs are assumed to be variable capacitances, such that the reflection coefficient
presented at the kth port is Γk = ejαk , where αk ∈ [−180◦ , 0◦ ]. This analysis assumes that
αk is uniformly distributed on [−180◦ , 0◦ ].
3.1.1

System Model
Efficient simulation of the RECAP is accomplished by combining full-wave simulation

of the array with network analysis for RE loading. Based on the analysis presented in
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NRE = 31

NRE = 63

NRE = 79

NRE = 4

NRE = 8

NRE = 13

Figure 3.2: RECAP structure consisting of a 9 × 9 dipole array, where NRE elements are
terminated with REs (filled circles) and feeds are marked by red squares.

Section 2.1.2, emc (θ, φ) is used to represent the matched patterns of feed ports when RE
ports are terminated with ΓR . This analysis considers using RECAPs at transmitter (Tx)
and receiver (Rx) to form a complete system, as depicted in Figure 3.3(a). Note that
unprimed and primed RECAP quantities denote those at Tx and Rx, respectively. At Tx
the kth feed is connected to source voltage vF,k with internal impedance Zs = Z0 . The
√
incident traveling waves aF on the feed ports are simply aF = vF /(2 Z0 ), and radiated far
fields are given by (2.6). The RE-terminated receive array is modeled in a similar manner,
except that due to the external incident field, a source wave term b00 must be included, such
that b0F = Γ0F,in a0F + b00 . Assuming a plane wave arriving at angle (θ`0 , φ0` ) and reciprocity,
h 0
iT
b00 = emc (θ`0 , φ0` ) einc (θ`0 , φ0` ),

(3.1)

where einc gives the polarization and complex amplitude of the incident plane wave.
A multipath model is assumed consisting of K clusters and Lk paths (or rays) within
the kth cluster, where the `th path in the kth cluster has angle of departure (θk` , φk` ),
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Figure 3.3: MIMO system model and noise matching for LNAs

0
0
angle of arrival (θk`
, φ0k` ), complex amplitude αk` , and time of arrival τk` , or einc (θk`
, φ0k` ) =

αk` e−jωτk` e(θk` , φk` ), where ω is frequency. Although depolarization of the paths is not
considered in this work, this could be included by making αk` a matrix. Superimposing the
waves due to all paths,
b00 =

Lk h
K X
iT
X
0
0
emc (θk`
, φ0k` ) αk` e−jωτk` emc (θk` , φk` ) aF .

(3.2)

k=1 `=1

|
3.1.2

{z
SRx,Tx

}

Noise Modeling
In order to consider a realistic system, where noise from the low-noise amplifier (LNA)

at the receiver depends on the feed reflection, an LNA model equivalent to [32] is employed,
where equivalent forward (aη ) and reverse (bη ) traveling noise waves at the LNA input are
needed to properly model real transistors. The receiver consists of a matching network,
forward and reverse noise sources, and LNA as shown in Figure 3.3(a). The multiport LNA
is assumed to consist of multiple uncoupled LNAs with optimal reflection coefficient Γopt ,
normalized equivalent noise resistance rn , and minimum noise figure Fmin , available from a
standard LNA data sheet.
Straightforward analysis at the connection of array and matching network reveals
bM = ΓFM aM + bFM ,
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(3.3)

where
ΓFM = SM,22 + SM,21 Γ0F,in (I − SM,11 Γ0F,in )−1 SM,12 ,


bFM = SM,21 I + Γ0F,in (I − SM,11 Γ0F,in )−1 SM,11 b0o .

(3.4)
(3.5)

The incident wave aA into the amplifier is found to be
aA = [I − ΓFM ΓA ]−1 (ΓFM bη + aη + bFM ) .
|
{z
}

(3.6)

Q

In this work, a fixed (non-RECAP) array is used as a reference case for gauging
performance improvement, and an identical uncoupled matching network is assumed on
each of the NF0 receive feeds such that ΓFM ≈ Γopt I for the reference, where Γopt is the
source reflection coefficient that provides optimal noise performance. The same uncoupled
matching network is employed for the RECAP, and noise coupling from one feed to the next
and deviation of ΓFM can lead to reduced SNR.
Figure 3.3(b) shows the uncoupled matching arrangement on each branch that transforms Γ0F,in,k = 0 to ΓFM,in,k = Γopt using a reciprocal lossless matching network, such that
SH S = I, where S is a 2×2 matrix. The required conditions are satisfied with

S11 = S22 = Γopt ,
q
S12 = S21 = j 1 − |Γopt |2 ej∠Γopt .

(3.7)
(3.8)

SM is a 2 × 2 block matrix, where the ijth block is equal to Sij I from (3.7) and (3.8), and
I is an NF0 ×NF0 identity matrix. Note that the fixed matching network can also be lumped
into the LNA to form the effective LNA shown in Figure 3.3(b), with new optimal reflection
coefficient Γ0opt and equivalent noise resistance rn0 .
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Plugging (3.2) into (3.5) and the result into (3.6) yields

aA = Q ΓFM bη + aη
|{z}
|
{z
}
y
n



+ SM,21 I + Γ0F,in (I − SM,11 Γ0F,in )−1 SM,11 SRx,Tx aF ,
|
{z
} |{z}
x
H

(3.9)

where H is the channel matrix, SRx,Tx is from (3.2), n is noise, and x and y are input and
output signals. The linear term Q applied to both signal and noise does not change capacity
and is omitted. The noise covariance Rη = E{nnH } is
2
2
Rη = ΓFM ΓH
FM σb + Iσa + 2Re {ΓFM σba } ,

(3.10)

where σb2 , σa2 , and σba are [43]
σb2 = E |bη,i |2



σa2 = E |aη,i |2

"
#
σv2
1
Fmin − 1
=
+
−
,
Z0
4rn
|1 + Γopt |2
"
#
|Γopt |2
σv2 Fmin − 1
+
,
=
Z0
4rn
|1 + Γopt |2


σ 2 |Γopt |
ej(π−∠Γopt ) ,
σba = E bη,i a∗η,i = v
Z0 |1 + Γopt |2

(3.11)
(3.12)
(3.13)

where rn = Rn /Z0 , Rn is the equivalent-noise resistance, σv2 = 4Pref Rn is the noise voltage
covariance, Pref = κT0 W , κ is Bolzmann’s constant, T0 is reference temperature, and W is
bandwidth. Since Pref is the same for the reference and RECAP systems and SNR of the
reference system is fixed, Pref has no effect on capacity and is set to 1.
Note that since a data sheet typically assumes Z0 = 50Ω, which is different from the
value used in this analysis, the transformation
Γopt

ds
Z0ds (1 + Γds
opt ) − Z0 (1 − Γopt )
= ds
ds
Z0 (1 + Γds
opt ) + Z0 (1 − Γopt )

(3.14)

ds
is required, where Γds
opt and Z0 are optimal reflection and reference impedance from the data

sheet.
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Summarizing, the MIMO input-output relationship is given by (3.9), where REdependent noise covariance Rη is computed from (3.10)-(3.13), where parameters Rn , Γds
opt ,
and Fmin are available from a standard LNA specification. Although computation of the
noise covariance in this way seems cumbersome compared to MIMO analyses that directly
specify Rη , the added complexity is necessary to capture noise coupling of the active ports
and variable input impedance of the receive array, which both affect capacity when thermal
noise is significant compared to interference.
3.1.3

LNA Specification
This analysis uses the MAXIM MAX2656 LNA, having Fmin = 1.79 dB, noise-

◦
equivalent resistance Rn = 43.23Ω, and optimum reflection coefficient Γds
opt = 0.130∠124.5

(at 1960 MHz and Z0ds = 50Ω) [44]. Since the specific LNA may affect the simulations and
conclusions, the impact of the LNA choice is briefly analyzed.
Analysis of the RECAP mainly depends on how sensitive the noise figure of the LNA
is to the reflection coefficient presented by the RECAP. Noise figure for uncoupled LNAs is
[43]
|Γin − Γopt |2
F = Fmin + 4rn
,
|1 + Γopt |2 (1 − |Γin |2 )

(3.15)

where Γin is the reflection coefficient looking into the output of one of the matching networks.
Assuming a lossless matching network shown in Figure 3.3(b) that transforms the source
reflection Γ0F,in,k = 0 to ΓFM,in,k = Γopt of the LNA, it can be shown that for Γ0F,in,k 6= 0,
1 − |Γopt |2 |Γ0F,in,k |2
,
F = Fmin + 4 rn
|1 + Γopt |2 1 − |Γ0F,in,k |2
|
{z
}
rn0

(3.16)

where rn0 is the the equivalent LNA noise resistance referenced back to the input of the
matching network where Γ0opt = 0.
Figure 3.4 shows noise figure degradation F − Fmin in dB for different values of rn0
and |Γin |2 using (3.16), where Γin , ΓF,in,k . As rn0 increases, the penalty of mismatch can
increase dramatically. However, the amplifier used in this analysis (as indicated in the figure)
has moderate sensitivity to mismatch, making it a good candidate for this initial study.
23

40
30

F − Fmin (dB)

20
10
0

r’n = 0.1

−10

r’n = 0.5
r’n = 0.97

MAX 2656

−20

r’n = 2
r’n = 4

−30

r’n = 6

−40
−50
0

r’n = 10
0.2

0.4

|Γin |2

0.6

0.8

1

Figure 3.4: Effects of rn0 and |Γin |2 on F − Fmin

Amplifiers with much higher rn0 would simply increase mismatch penalty, which would more
strongly constrain the set of useful RECAP states, possibly resulting in reduced capacity.
3.1.4

MIMO Channel Modeling
The channel matrix H is given by (3.9), where SRx,Tx is found according to the path-

based model in (3.2). In this work attention is restricted to the azimuthal plane (θ and θ0
are 90◦ ). Two propagation models are assumed for the paths between Tx and Rx:
Uniform Model
In this simple model, a single cluster is assumed (K = 1) with L = L1 rays having
arrival times τ1` = 0. Angles of arrival (φ01` ) and departure (φ1` ) are uniformly distributed
on [0◦ , 360◦ ] and α1` has a unit variance complex normal distribution.
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SVA Model
The more realistic Saleh-Valenzuela angular (SVA) model [45] assumes K clusters,
where the arrival of the kth cluster (τk ) has the conditional pdf
p(τk |τk−1 ) = Λe−Λ(τk −τk−1 ) , τk−1 < τk < ∞, τ1 = 0,

(3.17)

where Λ is the arrival rate of the clusters. Relative arrival time of the `th ray within the kth
cluster has the pdf
p(τk` |τk,`−1 ) = λe−λ(τk` −τk,`−1 ) , τk,`−1 < τk,`−1 < ∞,
τk1 = τk ,

(3.18)

where λ is the arrival rate of rays.
The complex amplitude of the `th ray in the kth cluster (αk` ) is complex gaussian,
where the variance decays exponentially with arrival time according to

E |αk` |2 = e−τk /TC e−(τk` −τk )/TR ,

(3.19)

and TC and TR are the cluster and ray decay time constant, respectively. The azimuthal angle
of the kth cluster at transmit and receive is Φk and Φ0k , respectively, which are uniformly
distributed on [0◦ , 360◦ ]. The relative transmit and receive angles of the `th ray in the
0
kth cluster are νk` = φk` − Φk and νk`
= φ0k` − Φ0k , which follow a double-sided Laplacian
√
√
distribution with pdf p(ν) = 1/( 2σ) exp[−| 2ν/σ|], where σ is the angular spread.

Although RECAPs that can adapt to each instantaneous value of αk` , φk` and φ0k`
are optimal, this rate of adaptation may be unrealistic for practical implementation. Thus a
system that adapts average RECAP performance is also considered where the φk` and φ0k` are
fixed, but only the αk` are random. The former and latter cases are referred as instantaneous
and average RECAP optimization, where average performance is computed in the latter case
using 10 realizations of αk` .
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3.1.5

Genetic Algorithm
Due to the large number of RE combinations, obtaining the optimal solution with

an exhaustive search is not feasible, and a genetic algorithm (GA) is employed. The GA
employed in this work is basically equivalent to that described in [10], except that REs at
both transmit and receive end are jointly optimized to maximize the capacity.
3.2

MIMO Capacity With Constraints
For the analysis of MIMO channel capacity using simulations, the RECAP structure

explained in Section 3.1 is used, for both Tx and Rx, forming a MIMO system. In order
to properly scale power and assess RECAP capacity gain, a reference non-RECAP antenna
array is considered, having the same number of feeds and constrained to the same area as
the RECAP and consisting of matched dipoles. Although antennas were placed as far apart
as possible for the reference case, some initial experiments were required to find the best
placement of feeds for the RECAP to give peak capacity. Having feeds too close to the
aperture center or edge reduced the capacity of the RECAP, and a balanced arrangement
gave the best performance.
Channel capacity is computed from
C = log2 (det[I + HRx HH R−1
η ]),
and for equal power allocation Rx =

PT
I,
NF

(3.20)

where PT is the total Tx power, and NF is the

number of Tx feeds. Lumping noise covariance into the channel matrix results in
Hη = HR−1/2
,
η

(3.21)

where R−1/2
is computed using (3.10). Plugging (3.21) into (3.20)
η
C = log2 (det[I +

PT
Hη HH
η ]),
NF

(3.22)

which can be interpreted as the capacity of an effective channel Hη for i.i.d. noise (unit
variance) and transmit power PT .
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A convenient way of enforcing the different power constraints in this study is to first
define the average single-input single-output (SISO) gain of a given system as
GSISO (H) =

kHk2F
,
NF NF0

(3.23)

where k.kF is Frobenius norm and NF0 is the number of feeds at Rx, which indicates the
average power gain provided by channel matrix H with respect to all active ports. The
desired SNR ρ of a system can then be fixed by normalizing that system by its SISO gain
−1/2

according to Hη = GSISO (Hη ) Hη and setting transmit power as PT = ρG−1
SISO (Hη ), resulting
in the equivalent capacity expression
C = log2 (det[I +

ρ
Hη HH
η ]),
NF

(3.24)

where · represents the normalized quantity. Below it is explained that how this normalization
can be used to implement power constraints for three realistic cases:
Fixed SNR Constraint (Case 1): In this case, the total amount of transmitted/collected
power is the same for both the non-RECAP and RECAP structures. This constraint ensures
that the RECAP can only increase capacity by improving channel orthogonality or conditioning. For Case 1, channel matrices corresponding to a non-RECAP reference (REF) and
the RECAP are normalized as
−1/2

(3.25)

−1/2

(3.26)

Hη,REF = GSISO (Hη,REF ) Hη,REF ,
Hη = GSISO (Hη ) Hη .

Normalizing each system individually by its own SISO gain forces the RECAP and reference
case to both have average SISO SNR ρ when computing capacity with (3.24).
Max EIRP Constraint (Case 2): Here the EIRP of the RECAP is constrained to be
no larger than that of the reference (non-RECAP) system. This is accomplished by setting
transmit power PT such that a prescribed SNR ρ is obtained for the reference system, and
this same transmit power is also used for the RECAP system. Maximum EIRP of the
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RECAP system is then limited to be equal to or lower than that of the reference system by
scaling the embedded RECAP radiation patterns according to
emc
i (φ)

maxφ,i emc
i,REF (φ)
=
emc
i (φ),
mc
maxφ |ei (φ)|
|
{z
}
ζi

(3.27)

mc
where emc
i (φ) refers to the radiation pattern of the ith feed at Tx, ei,REF (φ) refers to the

one corresponding to the ith feed of the reference (non-RECAP) Tx, and emc
i (φ) is used in
place of emc
i (φ) when computing SRx,Tx in (3.2) when ζi is less than or equal to 1 (i.e. when
a RECAP feed provides higher maximum gain than a non-RECAP feed). The non-RECAP
and RECAP channels are normalized respectively with (3.25) and
−1/2

Hη = GSISO (Hη,REF ) Hη .

(3.28)

Note that although the advantage of transmit beamforming by the RECAP is removed due
to the maximum EIRP normalization, both channels are normalized by the SISO gain of
the reference system, preserving possible enhanced power collection with receive RECAP
beamforming.
Average Transmit Power Constraint (Case 3): In this case, only average transmit
power is constrained such that a prescribed SNR ρ is obtained for the reference system,
and no constraint is placed on directional gain of Tx or Rx antennas. Specifically, channel
matrix normalization is done using (3.25) and (3.28), allowing the RECAP to obtain a power
advantage through both transmit and receive beamforming.
3.3

Performance Versus Complexity Analysis
In order to study the effect of increasing complexity on the performance of the RECAP

structure, both 2 × 2 and 4 × 4 MIMO systems are considered. Simulations were performed
for all combinations of the number of reconfigurable elements NRE = {4, 8, 13, 31, 63, 79} for
2 × 2 MIMO system, NRE = {4, 8, 13, 29, 61, 77} for 4 × 4 MIMO system, and the number of
reconfigurable states NRS = {2, 4, 8, 16, 32}. Furthermore, the power constraints presented
in Section 3.2 are also considered in this analysis. The channel capacity is computed for a
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single user communication using (3.24) with reference SNR of ρ = 10 dB, where non-RECAP
capacity is independent from the power constraint and is 5.54 bits/s/Hz for a 2 × 2 MIMO
system with L = 4 multipath, and 9.65 bits/s/Hz for a 4 × 4 MIMO system with L = 8
multipath.
Figure 3.5 plots the optimized capacity for all combinations of NRE and NRS versus
total RECAP complexity or log2 NTRS = NRE NRB . Figure 3.5(a) and (b) plots the results for
2 × 2 and 4 × 4 MIMO systems respectively, when the average transmit power is constrained
(Case 3). The curves clearly show diminishing performance returns with increasing number
of reconfigurable elements NRE and number of reconfigurable bits NRB . Results reveal that
for low values of NRE , having more states for a given level of complexity may be more helpful
then having more REs. The performance saturates at NRE = 63 and NRE = 61 for 2 × 2 and
4 × 4 MIMO systems, respectively. For fixed value of NRE , maximum increase in capacity
takes place while going from 2 to 4 RSs and is negligible for NRS > 8. A comparison with
the non-RECAP case reveals that for a RECAP with sufficient complexity, approximately
150% capacity enhancement is possible for the 2 × 2 MIMO system and 100% for the 4 × 4
MIMO system.
Figure 3.5(c) and (d) plots the corresponding results for max EIRP power constraint
(Case 2). The overall trend is the same as observed for average transmit power constraint,
however the capacity improvement when compared with non-RECAP reduces to approximately 100% for the 2 × 2 and 53% for the 4 × 4 MIMO systems. Figure 3.5(e) and (f)
plots the results for fixed SNR constraint (Case 1). In this scenario the performance gets
saturated much earlier (in terms of NRE ) as compared to the previous two cases. Also the
performance advantage of using RECAPs is reduced to only 25% for the 2 × 2 MIMO and
40% for the 4 × 4 MIMO systems.
Overall the results depict that RECAPs are most advantageous when beamforming
is allowed at receive and/or transmit nodes. The required complexity in RECAP to attain
optimal performance depends on the underlying power constraint, and in the best case
scenario the performance saturates for approximately eight REs per wavelength with 8 states
per RE. Based on these findings, rest of analysis uses NRS = 8, NRE = 79 for the 2×2 MIMO
system, and NRE = 77 for the 4 × 4 MIMO system.
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Figure 3.5: MIMO Capacity versus RECAP complexity: (a) 2 × 2 MIMO with average
transmit power constraint (b) 4 × 4 MIMO with average transmit power constraint (c) 2 × 2
MIMO with EIRP constraint (d) 4 × 4 MIMO with EIRP constraint (e) 2 × 2 MIMO with
average SNR constraint (f) 4 × 4 MIMO with average SNR constraint. Numbers 1 to 5 under
curves show NRB values (same pattern used but not labeled in other curves).
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3.4

MIMO Capacity Analysis Using Simulations
Since the advantage of RECAP may depend on the number of antennas, both 2×2

and 4×4 MIMO systems are considered in this analysis. Figure 3.1 shows the top view of
transmit/receive antennas for the RECAP and non-RECAP structures for the analyzed 2×2
and 4×4 MIMO systems. Results are for the uniform path-based model and reference SNR
ρ = 10 dB, unless otherwise noted.
3.4.1

Single User MIMO Capacity
Channel capacity for single user communication is computed using (3.24) where Hη

is computed using the cases in Section 3.2.
2×2 MIMO System
Figure 3.6(a) plots the capacity for the RECAP and non-RECAP structures for average and instantaneous optimization. Note that capacity for the non-RECAP does not
change with constraint type, since the reference has constant SNR, and the slight difference
with respect to optimization type is due to different Monte Carlo realizations. For fixed
SNR (Case 1), RECAP capacity is only marginally better than that of the non-RECAP,
indicating that two channels of sufficient quality are obtained without reconfigurability, and
the RECAP cannot significantly improve this.
The main advantage of RECAP is power, with significant improvements seen when
moving to the EIRP constraint (Case 2) and the transmit power constraint (Case 3). It is also
apparent that average optimization is only slightly worse than instantaneous optimization,
which is reasonable for power enhancement, since multipath directions are mainly important,
not the phases of signals sent in those directions.
4×4 MIMO System
Figure 3.6(b) shows that RECAP performance is more flat with respect to the constraint type for the 4×4 MIMO system, suggesting that power advantage is less important
and more opportunity for improving channel conditioning exists. Also a more significant
gap is seen between average and instantaneous optimization, indicating not only mutli-path
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Figure 3.6: Instantaneous and average MIMO channel capacity for a simple non-RECAP
array (dashed lines) and RECAP (solid lines): (a) 2×2 MIMO with L=4 (b) 4×4 MIMO with
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directions but also phases are important to attain peak capacity. Finally it is interesting
that the transmit power constraint for the 2×2 RECAP system gives almost the same performance as the 4×4 system with the EIRP constraint.
3.4.2

Single User MIMO Under Interference Constraint
Most practical systems for personal wireless communications are interference limited,

and therefore the effect of interference on single-link capacity is analyzed here in detail. In
order to model the effect of interference, R0η is extended to be the covariance matrix of noise
and interference, or
b
bH
b H PT ,
R0η = Rη + H
bF
N

(3.29)

b represents the channel matrix between the interferer and receiving antennas, other
where H
bF = NF .
.̂ quantities are for interferer, analogous to those at Tx, and it is assumed that N
Plugging (3.29) into (3.20) and simplifying yields
C = log2 (det[I +

ρ
ρb b b H −1
(I +
Hη Hη ) Hη HH
η ]),
b
NF
NF
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(3.30)

16

(b)

(a)

14
5 dB

Capacity (bits/s/Hz)

12

0 dB

0 dB

10

10 dB

5 dB

10 dB

8

4
2
0
Case 1

20 dB

20 dB

6

Case 2

0 dB

0 dB
5 dB
10 dB

10 dB

20 dB

20 dB

5 dB

Case 3 Case 1

Case 2

Case 3

Figure 3.7: Channel capacity for single user 2×2 MIMO with fixed interference for a simple
non-RECAP array (dashed lines) and RECAP (solid lines): (a) uniform multipath L=4 (b)
SVA model

b η )PbT is interference-to-noise ratio. Since ρb depends on proximity of the
where ρb = GSISO (H
interferer, values of ρb between 0 to 20 dB are considered. It is assumed that the interfering
b Rx,Tx is computed as
node employs a non-RECAP structure and S

b Rx,Tx =
S

bk
b L
K
h
iT
X
X
0
b0 , φb0 ) α
b mc (θbk` , φbk` ).
Emc
(
θ
bk` e−jωbτk` E
FT
k`
k`
FT

(3.31)

k=1 `=1

2×2 MIMO System
Figure 3.7(a) plots the capacity of a 2×2 system with L = 4 multipath for both nonRECAP and RECAP. The case for ρb =0 dB, is similar to no interference. As ρb increases,
bF = NF ,
non-RECAP capacity steadily drops towards zero, since for interference with rank N
it is not possible for the non-RECAP to null the effect. Although capacity for both the
non-RECAP and RECAP is falling with increasing ρb, closer inspection reveals that the
capacity gain of using the RECAP over the non-RECAP actually increases with increasing
ρb. Performance degradation is much smaller for the RECAP since REs can be used to null
interference, suggesting the possibility of aggressive spectral reuse.
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Figure 3.8: Channel capacity for single user 4×4 MIMO with fixed interference for a simple
non-RECAP array (dashed lines) and RECAP (solid lines): (a) uniform multipath with L=8
(b) SVA model

4×4 MIMO System
The results for varying ρb are shown in Figure 3.8(a) for L=8. The overall effect is
same as that of 2×2 system, but the curves are flatter with respect to the power constraint,
indicating that power advantage is less important for more feeds for fixed interference as
well. However, improvement relative to the non-RECAP is still very significant, especially
for severe interference.
3.4.3

Multi-User MIMO
Building on the idea of employing aggressive spectral reuse, next a true multi-user

scenario is considered where users optimize their RECAPs to maximize sum capacity. This is
different from the case of fixed interference, since the role of the transmit RECAP becomes
more important to reduce interference to the other user. Although for fixed interference,
the user does not have control over interference, he also does not care about how much
interference he causes. For the multi-user case, interference can be controlled but users also
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Figure 3.9: Channel capacity for two-user 2×2 MIMO for a simple non-RECAP array (dashed
lines) and RECAP (solid lines): (a) uniform mutli-path with L=4 (b) SVA model

impact each other. Capacity degradation due to interference depends on proximity, and ρb
between 0 and 20 dB is again considered.
Two links are considered, where each receiving user experiences interference from the
transmitter of the other link and a joint optimization is done in order to maximize the sum
capacity of both links. Individual capacity of each link is calculated using (3.30), except now
mc
in (3.31), the Tx RECAP patterns of the other link are employed instead of b
e (θbk` , φbk` ) for

a non-RECAP. Figure 3.9(a) shows MIMO channel capacity per user for the 2×2 multi-user
system with increasing ρb, exhibiting similar RECAP capacity gain as the fixed interference
case. The relative gain in moving from Case 1 to Case 2 is higher for multi-user compared
the single user case with fixed interference, likely due to the fact that Tx RECAPs can now
be controlled to avoid interference.
Figure 3.10(a) shows the results for the 4×4 MIMO system. By increasing ρb, the
improvement with respect to constraint type becomes even flatter than the 4×4 case for
fixed interference. Surprisingly, RECAP capacity per user is now lower than that for fixed
interference, indicating that jointly suppressing incoming interference and avoiding outgoing
interference becomes more difficult for more active feeds.
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Figure 3.10: Channel capacity for two-user 4×4 MIMO for a simple non-RECAP array
(dashed lines) and RECAP (solid lines): (a) uniform mutli-path with L=8 (b) SVA model

3.4.4

SVA Propagation Model
The simple path-based model is convenient, but possibly over-simplistic to represent

true propagation scenarios, and hence Saleh Valenzuela Angular (SVA) model [45] is also
considered in this analysis. The parameters of the model are assumed to be TC = 34 ns,
TR = 29 ns, 1/Λ = 17 ns , 1/λ = 5 ns and σ = 26◦ , taken from [45]. The model makes use
of a threshold value after which it stops looking for multipath, which is assumed to be -10
dB, generating 50 multipath on average.
Results for SVA channel simulations have been plotted next to the respective plots for
the simple path-based model in Figures 3.7 - 3.10. There is not a dramatic impact compared
to the simple channel model. For the non-RECAP case, capacity is slightly more degraded
in some results with increasing ρb due to more paths. For the RECAP case the curve trends
are similar, but curves are shifted up slightly in some results showing that RECAP is more
advantageous with increased multipath. However, in general changes are only marginal.
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3.4.5

Effects of Losses and Bandwidth on Channel Capacity
Bandwidth limitations and RE loss are important considerations in practical RECAP

structures, and in this section these two effects are studied. First loss is considered by
including a series resistance with each RE ranging from 0-10 Ω. Figure 3.11(a) shows the
results corresponding to the 2×2 single user system without any interference. There is no
impact of loss for Case 1 since power differences are removed. Moving to Cases 2 and 3, the
impact of loss becomes increasingly prominent, resulting from reduced gain of the RECAP,
which decreases the channel capacity. More performance loss is observed for the 4×4 MIMO
system as shown in Figure 3.11(b).
Another important aspect is finite bandwidth, and in order to study its effect a
two sided bandwidth of 20 MHz is assumed at a center frequency of 3 GHz. Capacity is
computed as the average capacity at the center frequency and two band edges for a single
fixed RECAP structure. Channels are normalized as before, except now the largest (worst
case) normalization factor of the three frequencies is used.
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Figure 3.12(a) indicates that finite bandwidth results in a small capacity reduction
for the 2×2 non-RECAP. Although RECAP performance is minimally impacted in Case 1,
for Cases 2 and 3 some reduction is seen, comparable to the difference of average versus
instantaneous optimization. Results for the 4×4 system in Figure 3.12(b) are similar with a
slightly larger gap between single frequency and finite bandwidth curves.
3.5

MIMO Capacity Analysis Using Measurements
This section extends the work presented earlier in this chapter, by performing actual

channel measurements with a prototype RECAP. Since the purpose of measurements was
more proof of the concept as compared to a complexity versus performance analysis, so only
the receiver (Rx) node is equipped with a 5×5 square parasitic RECAP array confined to an
area of 1λ×1λ, where a detailed analysis of the parasitic RECAP is presented in Section 2.1.3.
Measurements are performed for both line-of-sight (LOS) and non-LOS scenarios for 2 × 2
and 4×4 MIMO systems for the case of a finite bandwidth (BW) as well as a single frequency.
For real-time optimization, a genetic algorithm is used.
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Figure 3.13: Channel-sounder-based setup for MIMO-RECAP measurements

Similar to simulations, the capacity improvement by employing a RECAP is assessed
for different power constraints. However, due to hardware limitations it is not possible to
apply the max EIRP constraint. Instead, a new case is considered in which non-RECAP
capacity is computed for comparison purposes. Based on the analysis presented in Section 3.2
the cases for fixed SNR constraint (Avg Rx SNR) and average transmit power constraint
(Fixed PT ) are considered in measurements.
3.5.1

Measurement Configuration
This section covers the details regarding relative transmit (Tx) and receive node lo-

cations for LOS and non-LOS measurements, experimental setup which was used for channel
acquisitions and the RECAP used in this study.
Node Locations
Figure 3.13 shows the basic measurement setup used in this study. It consists of a
Tx node which uses a usual (non-RECAP) array as well as interfering antennas. The Rx
node has a RECAP with multiple feeds, where the number of feeds depends on whether the
2 × 2 or 4 × 4 MIMO system is considered. For LOS measurements, both Tx and Rx nodes
are placed in a single room separated by 10m as shown in Figure 3.14. Red rectangles mark
the location of Tx and Rx nodes while blue circles mark the location of possible interferers.
For the non-LOS measurement, the Tx node location stays the same while the Rx node is
moved to the hallway (at label Rx2).
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Rx 2
Rx 1

Tx

Figure 3.14: Location of Tx and Rx node for LOS (Rx1) and non-LOS (Rx2) measurements,
where blue circles mark the location of interfering antennas

Experimental Setup
A MIMO channel sounder similar to the one presented in [46] was used for the measurement campaign, where both Tx and Rx arrays are connected to the MIMO channel
sounder. An SPI-based digital-to-analog (D/A) conversion unit was implemented at the
receiver to control the bias voltage Vbias on the reconfigurable elements. The measurement
setup is depicted with a block diagram in Figure 3.13. The FPGA-based SPI implementation
is integrated with the channel sounder, allowing random RECAP states to be be streamed
in a synchronized fashion to SPI-based D/A converters, providing automatic pairing of the
channel snapshots and RECAP states.
Transmit Node
The transmit node consists of an array of 8 monopole antennas with a ground plane
below them, which is partitioned in two parts: a usual (non-RECAP) array that represents
the transmitter (squares) radiating desired signals, and the remaining 4 elements that represent interfering antennas (filled circles) as shown in Figure 3.15. For analysis of 2×2 and
4×4 MIMO systems, blue squares alone or blue and black squares are used for the active
transmit elements, respectively. The feeds of the transmit node are located at the corners of
an area of 1λ×1λ.
The signal transmitted by the Tx node consists of eight frequency tones separated
by 10 MHz with a center frequency of 2.55 GHz. The total transmit power is 23 dBm. For
the analysis of results a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of 10 dB is assumed, while the achieved
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Non−RECAP − Tx
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Figure 3.15: Top view of the antenna configurations used for the MIMO-RECAP measurements

SNR through practical measurements was approximately 60 dB for LOS channels and 20 dB
for non-LOS channels.
3.5.2

Measurement Results
A simple genetic algorithm (GA) is implemented for the optimization of the RECAP

and its performance with respect to a random search is presented for MIMO capacity maximization. MIMO capacity results are compared with the case when a usual (non-RECAP)
array is present at Rx, verifying the capacity enhancement possible using RECAPs. Figure 3.16 shows the channel measurement setup for the LOS case, marking the relative positions of the transmit and receive node. The measured capacity results for 2 × 2 and 4 × 4
MIMO systems are depicted in Figure 3.17 and 3.18 respectively. The left plot in each group
is for the random search (solid lines) and the right plot is for the GA (dashed lines).
2 × 2 MIMO System
Figure 3.17(a) presents the results for LOS channels corresponding to three normalization cases and varying interference-to-noise ratio (ρ̂) per interferer over a bandwidth of
70 MHz. It is observed that although the GA is not fully optimized, it still provides much
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Tx

Rx

Figure 3.16: Photo showing the LOS environment where measurements were taken and the
relative positions of the Tx and Rx nodes

better capacity than a random search. Both non-RECAP and RECAP capacity drop with
increasing ρ̂. However a relative comparison shows that for high interference the performance
advantage using RECAP increases (reaching to 200%) for ρ̂=20 dB.
Figure 3.17(b) considers the same cases, except that only a single frequency bin is
optimized (narrowband system). The increased capacity of the single-frequency optimization
is expected, since it is well known that nulling at a single frequency is much simpler than
wideband nulling. Overall, fixed transmit power performs better than fixed SNR, indicating
that for the single-frequency case, beamforming can provide a significant advantage.
Figure 3.17(c) and (d) show the same configurations as (a) and (b), but now in the
non-LOS (hallway) environment. The trends for the 2×2 non-LOS case are similar to the
LOS case, except that beamforming advantage for fixed transmit power appears to be higher,
even for wide bandwidth.
4 × 4 MIMO System
Figure 3.18(a) and (b) present channel capacity corresponding to a 4 × 4 MIMO
system for the LOS environment for wide bandwidth and single frequency. Similar to the
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Figure 3.17: Peak measured capacity for a 2 × 2 MIMO system. Random search on left and
GA on right of each subplot

2×2 system, the GA is able to find much better solutions than the random search, especially
for large ρ̂. For the results corresponding to the 4 × 4 system, it seems that fixed SNR in
general performs the same or better than fixed transmit power. This is likely due to the
increased difficulty of the optimization problem, since for the same aperture there are more
feeds (fewer REs and more paths to enhance), and more interfering antennas need to be
nulled out, meaning fewer degrees of freedom are left over for beamforming. Figure 3.18(c)
and (d) show similar trends as for the non-LOS environment. The main new observation is
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that even the genetic algorithm is unable to provide very large capacity improvement for the
wideband non-LOS case.
3.6

Chapter Summary
This work has analyzed MIMO capacity improvements possible with a simple RE-

CAP structure for different scenarios and system power constraints. The results indicate
that very large gains relative to fixed antenna MIMO systems are possible, especially for
interference-limited and multi-user environments, suggesting that RECAPs may enable ag44

gressive spectral reuse. Consideration of finite bandwidth and losses has indicated that
RECAPs can also provide most of this capacity improvement even with these practical impairments. Simulations work was supported with MIMO measurements, highlighting the fact
that efficient real-time optimization algorithms are required to provide near-peak capacity
with minimum possible optimization time.
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Chapter 4
Key Establishment Employing Reconfigurable Antennas
While traditional security measures for wireless communication are implemented at
the upper layers of the communication protocol stack, applying appropriate techniques at the
physical layer can serve to enhance security. For example, in [35, 36] the idea of exploiting
common randomness for secure communications was established, showing that two nodes
can achieve perfectly secure communications in an information theoretic sense without the
need for a-priori shared information. In [37, 47, 48], the ability to generate secure keys by
exploiting this common randomness was analyzed, proving under what conditions perfectly
secret keys can be generated by two nodes.
Since electromagnetic propagation and antennas can be theoretically reciprocal, if
two radios transmit training data to each other using half-duplex communication and use
the received training sequences to estimate the channel transfer function from the transmit
to receive antenna terminals, the observed channel estimates will be the same to within estimation errors. Thus, a reciprocal channel can be used as a source of common randomness
for key establishment, which was suggested as early as [49]. Later work explores the limits of
key establishment using a reciprocal scalar channel [50, 51] and develops practical algorithms
based on channel quantization [52–56]. Analysis and measured performance of key establishment for spatially correlated multi-input multiple-output (MIMO) channels was treated
in [57–59]. Recently, the impact of channel sparsity in reciprocal channel key generation has
been investigated [60].
An important limitation of key establishment using quantization of a shared reciprocal channel occurs when the channel is static or very slowly fading, since the amount of
common randomness is limited. In [14] the useful idea of using a reconfigurable antenna for
key establishment was presented, where random states of an electronically steerable parasitic
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array (ESPAR) are used to create a random reciprocal channel state at the two communicating nodes, even when the underlying propagation channel is static. Since [14] was only a
proof-of-concept and did not consider vulnerability with respect to an eavesdropper, this author presented initial simulations and measurements of a scalable reconfigurable antenna in
[38] and [39], respectively, suggesting that with sufficient antenna complexity, keys that are
secure with respect to a single-antenna eavesdropper can be generated. Note that although
this author performed the work presented in [38] and [39], that work is not revisited in this
dissertation.
This chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the security of key establishment
methods that employ reconfigurable antennas and channel reciprocity to generate common
randomness. This study overcomes limitations of previous work through detailed simulation
and direct measurement. First, in contrast to [14], the antenna used in this work has scalable
complexity, allowing determination of the full potential of this technology. Second, the
case of an eavesdropper equipped with multiple antennas is considered, since only a singleantenna eavesdropper was considered in this author’s previous work. Finally, unlike [39]
where due to hardware limitations only two-node measurements were performed, three-node
measurements are provided here, providing a more accurate characterization of the secrecy
obtained. The analysis reveals not only the conditions under which reconfigurable antennas
provide good key generation rates, but also the level of security achieved using the approach
in the presence of a close, multi-antenna, passive eavesdropper.
4.1

System Model
Figure 4.1 shows the system model considered in this analysis in which two legiti-

mate nodes designated as Alice and Bob communicate in the presence of an eavesdropper
Eve. While Alice possesses a RECAP, Bob is equipped with a single antenna, thus concentrating on the performance improvement obtained with a RECAP without the complexity
of coordinating reconfiguration at both radios. Eve possesses an array of NE elements that
is assumed to surround Alice’s RECAP, as this creates a high level of vulnerability. The
estimated narrowband scalar (single antenna) channels at Bob and Alice are respectively
denoted as â and â0 , where the carat (ˆ·) is used to emphasize that these are estimated quan47
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Figure 4.1: Top view of the antenna arrangement in the security analysis, where Bob has a
single antenna (black square), Alice has a RECAP with a single feed antenna (black square)
and programmable REs placed on a regular grid (empty circles), and Eve has an array of
antennas surrounding the RECAP (filled circles).

tities. Because of reciprocity, the differences between these two estimates result only from
channel estimation errors, imperfect calibration designed to remove non-reciprocal contributors to the channel (i.e. radio circuitry), channel time variation between estimation of the
two channels, or other practical effects. The vectors b̂ and ĉ respectively represent Eve’s
estimates of the multi-antenna channels from Alice and Bob. Note that channel variables a,
b, and c indicate ideal channels not corrupted by estimation error.
4.1.1

Parasitic RECAP
Alice’s RECAP consists of a single feed antenna placed at the center of a uniform

two-dimensional 5 × 5 square grid of area 1λ × 1λ with an inter-element spacing of λ/4, as
depicted by the square in Figure 4.1. The terminals of this central antenna are connected to
the radio transceiver circuitry. Other identical antennas are placed at the other grid positions
(open circles in Figure 4.1), with the terminals of each of these parasitic antennas connected
to a circuit that can tune the reactance loading the antenna. Each tunable parasitic antenna
is therefore termed a reconfigurable element (RE), with NRE indicating the total number of
REs used to construct the RECAP.
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Although a very complex RECAP structure is used, the goal of this work is to understand what level and type of reconfigurability is sufficient to capture most of the security
benefit (i.e. the point of diminishing returns). Figure 4.2 shows the four different RECAP
arrangements used in this study, where the filled circles represent placement of the REs on
the grid. It is expected that with more elements, the RECAP will be able to fully exploit the
spatial degrees of freedom within the propagation channel for key establishment, although
REs placed further from the feed element will likely have reduced impact on the achieved
performance. Motivated by this observation, two different arrangements for NRE = 8 are
considered to allow exploration of the impact of RE proximity to the feed antenna.
For the simulations presented in this work, the feed antenna and REs use z-oriented
half-wave dipole elements that are easily modeled with electromagnetic simulation software.
In contrast, the experiments use z-oriented quarter-wave monopole antennas due to their
fabrication simplicity. While using different antennas for the simulations and experiments
may create some differences, having similar (theoretically identical) radiation patterns for
the two elements suggests that the simulations and measurements should result in similar
performance behaviors. The reconfigurable element used in this work is similar to the one
presented in Section 2.1. The number of states (NRS ) of REs used in study is chosen from
measured results of a varactor-diode based RE, where NRS states are uniformly distributed
over bias voltages ranging from 1 to 5 volts.
4.2

Information Theoretic Analysis
Two information theoretic metrics are used in this work to quantify the impact of RE-

CAP reconfigurability on the key establishment performance. This section briefly discusses
the metrics and their computation using channel observations.
4.2.1

Key Establishment Metrics
Exploiting common randomness for secure communications was first analyzed in an

information theoretic context in [35]. Assuming two legitimate nodes observe random variables X and Y , while an eavesdropper observes Z, [35] shows that secrecy capacity is bounded
from above by min[I(X; Y |Z), I(X; Y )], where I(·; ·) is mutual information. Furthermore, it
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NRE = 82
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Figure 4.2: RECAP structure with elements arranged on a 5 × 5 regular grid, where NRE
reconfigurable elements (black circles) are terminated with tunable impedances and the center
element (black square) is the feed. Dipole or monopole antennas are aligned along the z-axis
(out of the page).

was shown that this bound can be approached by discussion over a public channel. Later,
the same authors analyzed the problem of secure key establishment exploiting common randomness [37, 47, 48], where I(X; Y |Z) is established as a critical security parameter and
referred to as the intrinsic conditional mutual information. A similar quantity is also used
in [60] to measure the theoretical key generation rate.
In the context of the system model in Figure 4.1, X and Y correspond to â and
â0 , which represent common random information that can be used to establish a common
message (or secret key) at the two legitimate nodes. The channels b̂ and ĉ correspond to
Z, or the information that Eve can use to guess the secret key. In [57, 58] the possibility of
using reciprocal fading MIMO channels as the source of common randomness to generate a
shared secret key is considered, where the intrinsic conditional mutual information bound is
adpoted to define two useful security metrics, as described below.
The first metric is available key bits, which refers to the maximum number of independent key bits that can be generated from each observation of the random channel,
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or


f (â, â0 )
,
IK = I(â; â ) = E log2
f (â)f (â0 )
0

(4.1)

where E {·} is expectation, and f (·) is a probability density function (pdf).
Because Eve’s channel estimates may be correlated with â and â0 , she may be able to
use these estimates to gain information about the established key. In order to account for
this a second metric, referred to as secure key bits or ISK , is defined, which is the number of
generated key bits per channel observation that can be secure with respect to Eve, given by
(
ISK = I(â; â0 |b̂, ĉ) = E log2

f (â, â0 |b̂, ĉ)
f (â|b̂, ĉ)f (â0 |b̂, ĉ)

)
.

(4.2)

When Eve’s channels are independent from the Alice-Bob channel, ISK = IK , indicating
all available bits are also secure from the eavesdropper. Note that under static channel
conditions and fixed antennas, IK = ISK = 0, indicating that no secret key can be generated.
However, by using random antenna states, the reciprocal end-to-end channel is randomized,
leading to nonzero security metrics.
Numerical Computation of Key Rate Metrics
Since it is not known whether the distribution of channels generated with the RECAP
will be Gaussian, this work develops a numerical technique that allows IK and ISK to be
computed directly from Monte-Carlo simulations. For computation of IK , the propagation
channels â and â0 may follow a non-Gaussian distribution, and the pdf f (â, â0 ) is not known.
However, since the estimation error at Bob and Alice can be considered independent, the
conditional pdf f (â, â|a) is just the product of two known noise pdfs for additive Gaussian
noise. Using this fact
0

Z

f (â, â ) =

f (â, â0 |a)f (a)da = Ea f (â, â0 |a),

= Ea fn [(â − a)/σa ] fn [(â0 − a)/σa0 ],
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(4.3)
(4.4)

where fn (·) is a unit variance complex Gaussian pdf, and σa2 and σa20 are estimation error
variance at Bob and Eve, respectively. Similarly,
f (â) = Ea f (â|a) = Ea fn [(â − a)/σa ],

(4.5)

f (â0 ) = Ea f (â0 |a) = Ea fn [(â0 − a)/σa0 ].

(4.6)

Combining (4.4)-(4.6) with (4.1) allows IK to be computed with a direct Monte-Carlo procedure without any need to empirically estimate the pdfs of the artificial non-Gaussian
channels. First, M random realizations of â and â0 (jointly distributed) denoted âm , â0m are
observed. For each of these realizations, N random realizations of a are observed which are
independent of â and â0 , and denoted amn . The mutual information is estimated using
P
N n f (âm , â0m |amn )
1 X
P
log2 P
IK ≈
.
0
M m
n0 f (âm |amn0 )
n00 f (âm |amn00 )

(4.7)

A similar Monte-Carlo procedure can be employed for computation of ISK after establishing the following theorem for conditional distributions.
Theorem 1 f (x, y|z) =

R

f (x, y|z, α)f (α|z)dα.

Proof:
Z

f (x, y, z, α) f (z, α)
dα
f (z, α)
f (z)
Z
1
=
f (x, y, z, α)dα
f (z)
f (x, y, z)
=
= f (x, y|z).
f (z)
Z

f (x, y|z, α)f (α|z)dα =

(4.8)

Theorem 1 can be used to compute the unknown pdf f (x, y|z) when the conditional distribution f (x, y|z, α) is known. Note that for simplicity a single antenna is used at Eve in the
analysis presented below, however it can be naturally extended to multiple antennas.
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The unknown pdfs in (5.27) when Eve has a single antenna can be obtained using
Theorem 1 and a Monte-Carlo procedure. Specifically,
Z
f (â, â |b̂, ĉ) = f (â, â0 |b̂, ĉ, a, b, c)f (a, b, c|b̂, ĉ)da db dc,
Z
f (â, â0 |b̂, ĉ, a, b, c)f (b̂, ĉ|a, b, c)
f (a, b, c)da db dc
=
f (b̂, ĉ)
1
=
Eabc f (â, â0 |a)f (b̂, ĉ|b, c),
f (b̂, ĉ)
0

(4.9)
(4.10)
(4.11)

where the second equality comes from applying Bayes’ rule to the second term under the
integral, and the removal of conditioning variables in the last equality results from conditional
independence. Likewise, the pdfs in the denominator of (5.27) are
f (â|b̂, ĉ) =
f (â0 |b̂, ĉ) =

1
f (b̂, ĉ)
1
f (b̂, ĉ)

Eabc f (â|a)f (b̂, ĉ|b, c),

(4.12)

Eabc f (â0 |a)f (b̂, ĉ|b, c).

(4.13)

Combining these results, ISK can be expressed as
Eabc f (â, â0 |a)f (b̂, ĉ|b, c)f (b̂, ĉ)
.
ISK = E log2
Eabc f (â|a)f (b̂, ĉ|b, c)Eabc f (â0 |a)f (b̂, ĉ|b, c)

(4.14)

Although this looks more complicated than the original expression, note that each of the
pdfs involves estimated channels conditioned on the actual channel, and is given directly in
terms of the noise pdfs alone. The required pdfs are
f (â, â0 |a) = fn [(â − a)/σa ] fn [(â0 − a)/σa0 ],
f (b̂, ĉ|b, c) = fn [(b̂ − b)/σb ] fn [(ĉ − c)/σc ],
f (b̂, ĉ) = Eb,c f (b̂, ĉ|b, c),

(4.15)
(4.16)
(4.17)

(4.5), and (4.6). As before the Monte-Carlo procedure operates by observing M joint random
realizations of the estimated channels (âm , b̂m , and ĉm ) and for each of these generating
N random realizations of the ideal channels (amn , bmn , and cmn ) to compute the inner
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expectations for each m. Although not shown in this dissertation, this numerical procedure
for computing IK and ISK has been validated using correlated Gaussian channels and available
closed form expressions [61].
Gaussian Channel Assumption
When Eve has more than one antenna, the large number of realizations required for
convergence of numerical computation of information theoretic metrics can lead to excessive
computation. Although developing closed-form bounds and low-complexity numerical computations for (4.1) and (5.27) is highly desirable, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Instead, to reduce the required computation, one can assume that the channels satisfy a
Gaussian distribution, allowing closed-form computation of IK and ISK . For channel observations that are correlated zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables, IK becomes [57]
IK = log2

|R̂aa ||R̂a0 a0 |
|R̂A0 A0 |

,

(4.18)

where | · | is the matrix determinant and covariances with lowercase subscripts denote
†

R̂x1 x2 = E{ĥx1 ĥx2 }

(4.19)

with {·}† indicating a conjugate transpose. Note that R̂aa and R̂a0 a0 are scalar variances
when Bob has a single antenna and Alice’s RECAP has a single feed antenna. Covariances
with uppercase subscripts represent those of stacked channel vectors, or
†

†

†

†

†

†

R̂X1 X2 ...XN = E{[ĥx1 ĥx2 ...ĥxN ]† [ĥx1 ĥx2 ...ĥxN ]}.

(4.20)

Using this notation, ISK becomes
ISK = log2

|R̂ABC ||R̂A0 BC |
|R̂BC ||R̂AA0 BC |
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.

(4.21)

4.2.2

Brute-Force Attack for Low RECAP Complexity
A potential concern for RECAP-induced channel fluctuations is that if total number

of states for RECAPs at Alice is too limited, a reduced complexity brute-force attack may be
possible. Consider the case when Eve has a single antenna but very high signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR), so that the channels b and c are almost exactly observed. For a static propagation
channel, Eve observes a 4-dimensional constellation of points (from 2 complex channels) as
Alice picks random RECAP states. Although Eve does not know the mapping of key bits to
the observed constellation points, she can record the sequence of constellation points. If the
combined RECAP complexity is too low, Eve can learn the key by simply trying all possible
mappings, which may be less complex than trying all possible key sequences.
One way to avoid this possibility is to consider how many total secure key bits (Nbits )
are required to be generated by a system during static channel conditions. By making the
combined RECAP complexity large enough, such that the number of possible mappings to
search is larger than 2Nbits , a reduced-complexity brute-force attack is avoided. Given a
single RECAP at Alice with NRE reconfigurable elements and NRS states, the total number
NRE
of RECAP states is NRS
. For a quantization order of M symbols per channel observation,

each constellation point has M possible mappings. Thus, the total combination of mappings
NRE
)

to check for all constellation points is M (NRS

and the condition

NRE
NRS
log2 M ≥ Nbits

(4.22)

is required to avoid a reduced-complexity brute-force attack. Figure 4.3 plots the left-handside of (4.22) for M = 4 and various values of NRE and NRS , indicating that for RECAPs with
modest complexity, a very large number of key bits can be generated securely under static
conditions. This also suggests the interesting possibility of using analog noise-like sources to
bias the reconfigurable elements, creating a virtually infinite number of reconfigurable states,
which appears to completely remove the possibility of the reduced-complexity attack.
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Figure 4.3: Maximum key bits that can be securely generated with a RECAP with limited
complexity under static conditions

4.3

Modeled Key Establishment Performance
This section covers the security versus complexity analysis of a parasitic RECAP

using full-wave simulations and network analysis. The electromagnetic propagation channel
is assumed to be static, and any change in the channel can only be caused by the RECAP.
Since additional time variation in the propagation would likely increase security, the static
channel represents a worst-case scenario.
4.3.1

RECAP Simulation
In this scenario, Eve’s antennas are near the RECAP, and because mutual coupling

between the RECAP and Eve’s antennas may reveal information that can help Eve more
easily determine the key, this coupling cannot be ignored. Therefore, the Numerical Electromagnetic Code (NEC) is used to model Eve’s and Alice’s arrays together. Since Bob is far
from Alice and Eve, his antenna is modeled separately and is assumed to lie in the far-field of
the other arrays. An analysis similar to the one presented in Section 2.1 is performed to com-
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mc
pute the radiation patterns of Alice’s feed antennas (emc
A (θ, φ)) and Eve’s array (eE (θ, φ))

for a specific RE termination.
4.3.2

Communication Channels
This study assumes that propagation is confined to the horizontal (xy) plane, and

therefore only the azimuthal radiation pattern (θ = π/2) is considered in this analysis. The
multipath model consists of L paths, where the `th path has angle of departure (π/2, φ` ),
angle of arrival (π/2, φ0` ), and complex amplitude α` . The channels become
a0 =
ci =

L
X
`=1
L
X

mc
0
emc
A (π/2, φ` )α` eB (π/2, φ` ),

(4.23)

mc
0
emc
E,i (π/2, φ` )α` eB (π/2, φ` ),

(4.24)

`=1

where a = a0 is the error-free reciprocal channel between Bob and Alice, ci is the channel
between Bob and Eve’s ith antenna, and emc
B is the azimuthally omnidirectional pattern of
Bob’s antenna. Because Eve’s antennas lie close to the RECAP, the computed coupling
between Alice’s feed antenna and Eve’s array elements gives the channel b with ith element
bi = ΓF,(1,i+1) ,

(4.25)

where ΓF has been ordered such that ΓF,(1,1) is the input reflection coefficient of the RECAP
feed port.
A difficulty in defining the security of the proposed scenario is that Eve may have a
much more sensitive receiver than Alice or Bob. Assuming the worst case of zero noise at
Eve (or infinite SNR) leads to an information theoretic security of zero, since there will be a
one-to-one mapping between the discrete RECAP-induced channel states of the ideal AliceBob channel and Eve’s channel. In order to not place any assumptions on the sensitivity of
Eve’s receiver, yet limit Eve’s effective SNR, the SNR of the pilot signal used for channel
estimation is limited by having Alice and Bob add artificial noise to the pilots they transmit.
This synthetic noise is only known by the nodes who transmit it, and therefore it cannot
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be subtracted by any other receiving node. Assuming that Alice and Bob have an intrinsic
SNR of 13 dB (due to receiver noise, non-reciprocity, etc.) and that Alice and Bob add
synthetic noise that is also 13 dB below the pilot signal level, this 3 dB degradation leads to
a composite SNR of 10 dB at Alice and Bob. On the other hand, it is assumed that Eve’s
receiver is noiseless, and since she only experiences artificial noise, her SNR is 13 dB.
With these SNR values established, the channel estimates at Alice, Bob, and Eve
are computed by corrupting the channels in (4.23)-(4.25) with additive estimation errors
modeled as zero-mean complex Gaussian random processes whose variances are chosen to
achieve the specified SNR values. Finally, IK and ISK can be computed.
4.3.3

Simulation Study
The simulations presented here consider two different channel scenarios: (a) Non-

line-of-sight (NLOS) using L = 10 paths and (b) line-of-sight (LOS) using L = 1. In both
scenarios, propagation path characteristics remain fixed and channel estimates are computed
for 106 different RECAP states. This allows construction of the relevant covariances required
for computing IK and ISK using the Gaussian assumption and, for some scenarios, allows
computation of the metric using the accurate numerical technique. When the channel type
is not specified, the NLOS channel is used. For all simulations, the results are averaged over
300 different channel realizations and 8 equally-spaced frequencies from 2.515 to 2.575 GHz.
When computing ISK for NE < 8, it is assumed that Eve’s antennas represent a subset of the
array of NE = 8 elements shown in Figure 4.1, and the results are averaged over all possible
sub-array configurations.
Security vs. Antenna Complexity
Figure 4.4 plots IK as a function of the number of states NRS for different values of the
number of reconfigurable elements NRE using the numerical method to compute (4.1) and
Gaussian assumption to compute (4.18). The error in the Gaussian assumption (difference
between the two curves) decreases as both NRS and NRE increase, demonstrating that the distribution of the channel realizations with more REs and more reconfigurable states becomes
increasingly Gaussian. As expected, the Gaussian assumption upper bounds the numerical
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Figure 4.4: Simulated IK as a function of NRS for different values of NRE , where curves
marked with ∗ and • are respectively obtained using the Gaussian assumption and numerical
computation: (a) NLOS channel (L = 10), (b) LOS channel (L = 1).

computations of IK . Figure 4.4 further shows that under both LOS and NLOS propagation,
the value of IK decreases with increasing NRS . With more reconfigurable states, the variance
of the channels obtained for different states decreases, reducing the number of available key
bits per channel observation. Although these results show that using NRS = 2 is beneficial
for high IK , care must be taken to ensure that the total complexity of the reconfigurable
antenna is not too small, as discussed in Section 4.2.2.
Finally, Figure 4.4 shows that for the same number of RE states, increasing the
number of REs improves IK . This occurs because increasing NRE physically adds complexity
to the coupling between the parasitic array and the feed element in the RECAP, thereby
increasing the range of possible RECAP radiation characteristics. However, the relative
benefit of additional REs diminishes as NRE increases, a result that is consistent with previous
results on RECAP beamforming [10] demonstrating that 8 parasitic elements per wavelength
are sufficient to exploit the degrees of freedom in the propagation channel. Note that although
NRE = 82 gives higher IK performance than NRE = 8, the more critical ISK metric is usually
lower, indicating that a larger array with higher spatial selectivity is more beneficial than
high coupling between the feed and parasitic elements.
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Figure 4.5: Simulated ISK as a function of NE for NRE = 24 and two values of NRS when
Eve knows b̂ alone, ĉ alone, or both b̂ and ĉ : (a) NLOS channel (L = 10), (b) LOS channel
(L = 1).

Relative Importance of Eve’s Channels
The results for IK do not consider the information (b̂ and ĉ) possessed by Eve that
can allow her to more easily determine the established key, and therefore ISK is analyzed.
When evaluating this metric, it is instructive to determine the relative importance of these
two channels in providing information to Eve. Therefore, three different cases for computing
ISK are considered:
Case 1: Eve knows both b̂ and ĉ,
Case 2: Eve knows only b̂, and
Case 3: Eve knows only ĉ.
Figure 4.5 plots the corresponding results for NRE = 24 computed using the Gaussian
assumption, with the results showing that b̂ is the main source of information for Eve for
both NLOS and LOS scenarios (lower ISK indicates more information leaked to Eve). This
result is logical, since fluctuations in ĉ arise only from a change in the patterns of Eve’s
antennas due to weak near-field coupling with Alice’s RECAP, whereas b̂ provides direct
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information about RECAP changes. Given this observation, only b̂ is considered when
computing ISK in the subsequent analysis. Interestingly, this observation is in contrast to
the case where a random propagation channel (not a random antenna) is used to generate
the key, where ĉ gives information to Eve and b̂ is a static channel with no information [58].
Because numerical evaluation of ISK is computationally demanding for NE > 1, ISK
and ISK,G are constructed using (4.14) and (4.21), respectively, for NE = 1 and then their
ratio is computed as γ = ISK /ISK,G . Then, for NE > 1, ISK is computed using the Gaussian
assumption in (4.21) and the results are then scaled by γ to obtain a corrected value of
ISK . Comparison of this corrected Gaussian result with values obtained using numerical
simulations for NE = 2 with NRE = 8 and NRS = 2 in an NLOS channel shows that the error
in the corrected Gaussian result is less than 4%.
Dependence on Eve’s Array Size
Figures 4.6(b)-(e) plot ISK as a function of NE for different values of NRE and NRS
using corrected Gaussian assumption. It is interesting to observe that for this worst-case
scenario in which Eve can estimate the RECAP pattern that creates the random channel
fluctuations, ISK decreases rapidly as NE increases. These results further confirm that the
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number of key bits per channel observation is maximized for NRS = 2 and for large values of
NRE . However, it is important to note that the channel statistics for small NRS become less
Gaussian, as evidenced by the increased difference between the results from the uncorrected
and corrected Gaussian assumption for IK .
Note that for the case with NRS = 2 and NRE = 24, comparison with Figure 4.6(a)
shows that approximately 35% of the available key bits remain secure in the presence of Eve
surrounding the RECAP with 8 antennas. This suggests that with proper selection of the
antenna topology, key generation using reconfigurable antennas can be made robust to even
well-equipped eavesdroppers. On the other hand, having too little or the improper type of
reconfigurability may lead to a system that is easily compromised.
4.4

Measured Key Establishment Performance
While the simulations have provided valuable insights into the potential of using so-

phisticated reconfigurable antennas for key establishment, the results depend on assumptions
that may not always be satisfied. Therefore, experimental measurements are conducted to
validate the observations drawn from the simulations. The communication scenario used is
similar to that used for the simulations, with the exception that λ/4 monopole antennas
mounted on a ground plane are used instead of λ/2 dipoles. Because of the inferior performance of the NRE = 82 RECAP configuration in terms of ISK predicted by the simulations,
this topology is excluded in the measurements.
4.4.1

Node Locations
Figure 4.7 identifies the relative positions of Bob, Eve and Alice for four different

measurement locations within the Research I building on the Jacobs University Bremen
campus. Location 2 is within a hallway while the other locations are in different university
laboratories. Outdoor measurements were taken on an open lawn as shown in Figure 4.8,
where the distance between Bob and Alice was approximately 40 m. To minimize temporal
variations in the channel, all measurements were collected over weekends or at night.
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Figure 4.7: Relative positions of Bob (B), Alice (A) and Eve (C) at four different locations
within an indoor environment. Arrows connect the different node locations for a given location
number.

Figure 4.8: Photograph of the outdoor measurement environment and the relative positions
of Alice, Bob and Eve for NRE = 8. The red ‘×’ indicates the antenna in Eve’s array that is
not used in measurements.

4.4.2

Experimental Setup
The experiments accommodate 2-node measurements (â and b̂) or 3-node measure-

ments (â, b̂ and ĉ), obtained using the configurations shown in Figures 4.9(a) and (b) respectively. In both cases, an 8×8 multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channel sounder
similar to that presented in [46] is used. The transmit signal consists of eight frequency tones
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Figure 4.9: 2-node and 3-node configurations used to measure channel responses for the
legitimate nodes (Alice and Bob) and eavesdropper (Eve).

spaced at 10 MHz intervals from 2.515 to 2.575 GHz. The channel for each transmit-receive
antenna pair is measured sequentially, with synchronization accomplished using Rubidium
references and synchronization (SYNC) units at the different nodes. Because the sounder
only has 8 transmit ports one of which is needed for connection to Bob’s antenna, only
NE = 7 antennas are used in Eve’s array.
The RECAP is connected to the MIMO channel sounder receiver, with RE biases
controlled using an SPI-based digital-to-analog (D/A) converter. The FPGA-based SPI
implementation is integrated with the channel sounder to allow synchronization between
the antenna switch states in the MIMO measurement system and the RECAP states. For
the 2-node configuration, Bob’s antenna is connected to a single output of the sounder
transmitter via a 20 m cable and Eve’s antennas are connected to the remaining 7 transmit
ports. The feed antenna on Alice’s RECAP is connected to a single receive port. To avoid
receiver saturation, 40 dB attenuators are placed between the transmitter outputs and Eve’s
antennas.
In the 3-node configuration, an additional high isolation (>80 dB) switch is used to
connect Eve’s antennas to the transmit ports (allowing measurement of b̂) or to the receive
ports (allowing measurement of ĉ). Eve’s low transmission power of −20 dBm again avoids
receiver saturation. Bob is implemented using a third radio node with a switch selectively
connecting a 23 dBm transmit signal or a terminator to the power amplifier driving Bob’s
antenna.
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setup when Eve knows b̂ alone, ĉ alone, or both b̂ and ĉ.

4.4.3

Results
All measured results use 106 channel snapshots to compute covariance matrices using

the Gaussian assumption or expectations using the numerical method. All of the results
are averaged over the 8 frequency tones in the transmit signal. For NE < 7, the results are
averaged over all possible NE -element sub-arrays.
Relative Importance of Eve’s Channels
Once again the relative importance of b̂ and ĉ is explored in terms of revealing
information to Eve. As explained in Section 4.3.3, cases where Eve knows b̂, ĉ or both
are considered in this analysis. Figure 4.10 plots IK and ISK for a 3-node measurement
conducted at indoor Location 1 when NRE = 24. These results confirm that ĉ provides little
information to Eve. As a result of this observation, it is assumed that Eve only knows b̂ in the
remainder of this analysis, allowing use of the data from the simpler 2-node measurements.
Interestingly, the security metrics appear to be higher for Location 1 as compared to other
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Figure 4.11: Measured IK and ISK as a function of NE for different values of NRE and NRS ,
where IK curves marked with ∗ and • are respectively obtained using the uncorrected and
corrected Gaussian assumption: (a) IK , (b)-(e) ISK .

locations. Since the SNR is fixed in the analysis, the higher metrics are likely due to more
favorable multipath.
Security vs. Antenna Complexity
Figure 4.11(a) plots IK as a function of NRS for several values of NRE , with the results
averaged over the four indoor measurement locations. The difference between the results of
the uncorrected and corrected Gaussian assumption observed in the measurements, which
for certain circumstances reaches 5%, is larger than that observed in the simulations. As
expected, IK decreases with increasing NRS , emphasizing that NRS = 2 again leads to the
highest number of key bits per channel observation.
Figures 4.11(b)-(e) plot ISK as a function of NE for different values of NRE and NRS ,
where again the results represent averages over four indoor measurement locations. ISK
decreases as NE increases, confirming the trend observed in the simulations. For this NLOS
scenario, provided that Alice has a RECAP with high reconfigurability (large NRE ), the
reduction in ISK created by having a large number of antennas at the eavesdropper relative
to an eavesdropper with a single antenna is limited to approximately 50%.
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Figure 4.12: Measured values of ISK as a function of NE for different values of NRE and NRS ,
where the curves for indoor and outdoor measurements represent averages over all experimental
results.

Dependence on Eve’s Array Size
Figure 4.12 compares selected results for ISK from Figure 4.11 obtained in the indoor
environment to comparable results obtained in the outdoor environment. These curves show
that the decrease in ISK with increasing NE is more dramatic for outdoor channels than for
the indoor channels, likely due to the fact that the outdoor scenario is characterized by a
dominant LOS path while the indoor scenario has stronger multipath components. Even
when NRE is large, the value of ISK for NE = 7 is approximately 20% of the value obtained
for NE = 1, showing the vulnerability created by the LOS channel that allows Eve to better
predict the channels observed at the legitimate nodes.
Dependence on Eve’s Array Configuration
The analysis presented above has assumed that Eve’s array surrounds the RECAP,
since it is expected that this configuration would allow Eve to best sample the random
radiation states of the antenna and track the key generation process. Arguably, this situation
would not be feasible in practice, and one may ask if a more natural array configuration for
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Figure 4.13: Measured ISK and as a function of NE for different values of NRE and NRS , where
solid and dashed curves are respectively obtained using average and worst case Eve antenna
configuration (a) NRS = 2, (b) NRS = 32.

the eavesdropper would exhibit the same behavior. To explore this idea, each measured data
set is processed to determine which subset of Eve’s antennas gives the lowest ISK for a given
NE , thus indicating the best that Eve can do with a smaller, more practical array.
Figure 4.13 depicts two sets of curves. In the first case, ISK is averaged over all
possible Eve configurations for a given NE , shown by solid lines. In the second case, Eve’s
array configuration is identified for each data set that produces the worst-case ISK for a given
NE , shown by dashed lines. The results show that for a target ISK level, Eve can typically
get by with 1-3 fewer antennas if she can pick her best configuration.
Figure 4.14 shows the worst-case configurations of Eve’s array for Location 2 for
different array sizes at Eve. The results for this and other locations (not plotted) typically
show that the wost-case configuration is for Eve to place her antennas on one side of Alice’s
RECAP. This probably occurs due to a dominant LOS or quasi-LOS component that is
present. Therefore, it appears that a more natural and compact array could be judiciously
placed by an eavesdropper to obtain nearly the same security reduction as is seen with a full
array that surrounds the RECAP.
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Figure 4.14: Worst-case configuration of Eve’s array for Location 2 (Hallway) where circles
indicate positions of Eve’s antennas.

4.5

Key Establishment in Simulated LOS Channels
The work presented earlier in this chapter demonstrates that RECAPs can effectively

enhance security in static multi-path and LOS channels. However, a potential weakness of
RECAP-based physical security is an eavesdropper that is present precisely on the LOS path
between the communicating nodes, allowing the eavesdropper to sample the same random
channel used to generate the key. In this section, the scenario of an eavesdropper on the
LOS path is characterized through simulations.
Figure 4.15(a) shows the communications scenario considered. Bob and Eve are
equipped with a single half-wave (λ/2) dipole antenna, while Alice has a 5×5 square parasitic
RECAP confined to an area of 1λ × 1λ. Quantities â and â0 are estimates of the reciprocal
channel at Bob and Alice, respectively, while Eve receives the estimated channels b̂ and ĉ.
Angular separation between â and â0 is represented by θ, where θ = 0◦ corresponds to the
case when Eve is exactly on the LOS path between Bob and Alice. An SNR of 10 dB is
assumed in the analysis presented below.
Since it is unknown to what extent the RECAP configuration affects security for this
scenario, a circular RECAP is also considered as shown in Figure 4.15(b). Elements placed in
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Figure 4.15: Top view of nodes in the security simulations, where Bob and Eve have a
single antenna and Alice has a RECAP with many programmable REs (hollow circles). Black
squares show the location of Bob’s antenna and Alice’s feed, while the blue circle shows a
possible position of Eve’s antenna depending on θ.

the inner and outer circle have a radius of 0.25λ and 0.5λ respectively. For both square and
circular RECAPs, the feed is placed at the center, while all other elements (hollow circles)
act as REs.
4.6

Analysis and Initial Results
The goal of this study is to analyze the security of the LOS communications scenario,

depending on the angular separation (θ) between â and b̂. Hence, the states of REs are
changed randomly to generate 106 communications channels, and later corresponding secure
bits are computed with respect to a certain θ. Note that Eve is in the far-field of Alice, so
the impact of ĉ on ISK is negligible. The dominant effect will be from b̂, and it is expected
that the worst-case occurs when θ = 0◦ . Note that in Figure 4.15, the reference angle θ◦ is
the direction of channel â. For a square RECAP IK can vary significantly with respect to
θ◦ . For this reason the results are averaged over the reference angles θ◦ = [0◦ , 5◦ , ..., 45◦ ].
Figure 4.16(a) plots IK for varying NRS when Alice has a square RECAP. The curves
corresponding to the numerical computation and the Gaussian approach are close to each
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Figure 4.16: IK for varying NRS using the numerical expectation method and the Gaussian
approximation: (a) Alice having a square RECAP (b) Alice having a circular RECAP.

other, indicating that RECAPs can generate close to Gaussian random channels. As demonstrated earlier, the Gaussian approximation upper bounds the numerical computation and
IK is maximized for NRS = 2, since extreme RE states appear to maximize the channel variance. Figure 4.16(b) plots IK when Alice has a circular RECAP. Although the exact values
of IK are slightly different for the two configurations of the RECAP, the general trends are
the same.
Figure 4.17 plots ISK with respect to θ for a square RECAP, and as expected, NRS = 2
maximizes ISK . Even for θ = θ◦ = 0◦ it is observed that a small number of bits are secure,
which is due to Eve’s finite SNR. For θ ≥ 0◦ , ISK increases almost linearly and later converges
towards the corresponding IK value. It is interesting to note that for an angular separation
of 30◦ approximately 90% of the bits are secure, while at θ = 10◦ approximately 40% of key
bits are secure. Also, it is observed that the gap between the numerical approach and the
Gaussian approximation increases with θ for NRS = 2, which likely occurs from the lower
NRS value producing less Gaussian statistics, where this effect would be more prominent
for high values of ISK . Figure 4.18 plots the corresponding results for a circular array. The
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Figure 4.17: ISK for varying θ and NRS using the numerical expectation method and the
Gaussian approximation when Alice has a square RECAP.
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approximation when Alice has a circular RECAP.
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general trends of curves are similar to the square array, emphasizing that exact configuration
of parasitic RECAP does not appear to have a significant impact on security.
4.7

Chapter Summary
This chapter has explored the effectiveness of using a highly reconfigurable antenna to

generate varying channel estimates that are in turn used to establish secret encryption keys
in a time-division duplex communication system. The results demonstrate that an increase in
the number of reconfigurable elements plays a vital role in increasing the number of key bits
that can be securely generated, where diminishing returns are seen near NRE = 16 elements
for the 1λ×1λ array size. The results also show that using only two impedance states per
RE maximizes the number of bits available per RECAP state, meaning that simple switches
may represent a practical RE termination.
Simulations and measurements demonstrate that a compact 5 × 5 parasitic reconfigurable antenna can secure up to 50% of the available key bits in a NLOS scenario, even
when an eavesdropper has an array surrounding the RECAP and a 3-dB SNR advantage.
For a LOS scenario with an eavesdropper on or near the LOS path, simulations reveal that
approximately 90% of key bits are secure, if there is an angular separation of at least 30◦
between the eavesdropper and the LOS path. The findings show that RECAPs represent a
promising candidate for key establishment based on reciprocal channel estimation for static
or slow-fading channels.
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Chapter 5
Secure Pattern Synthesis for Physical Layer Security
Security is an important concern for today’s wireless communications systems, where
the public nature of the transmission enables potential interception of sensitive information
by unauthorized parties. Typically, wireless security is accomplished by encrypting binary
information before modulation and transmission over the channel. However, recent work has
focused on developing techniques that exploit the physical layer, including the antennas and
propagation channel, to provide increased security in wireless transmissions. Examples of
such techniques may be found in [14, 15, 49, 56, 58, 62–64]. A detailed analysis of physical
layer security using reconfigurable antennas is presented in Chapter 4. However, the optimal
control of a reconfigurable or adaptive array for peak security is still an open question, and
this topic is addressed in this chapter.
One method for using the physical layer to achieve increased secrecy is to use conventional antenna array synthesis to design a transmit radiation pattern that provides high
gain to a desired receiver and low gain in directions of potential eavesdroppers [65]. Such an
approach reduces the likelihood that an attacker can decode the information-bearing signal,
particularly if the channel coding is carefully matched to the realized channel gain. The
information-carrying transmit radiation pattern designed in this way is referred to herein as
the signal pattern. To further enhance security, artificial noise can be transmitted on noise
patterns that are ideally designed to be orthogonal to the signal pattern, thereby realizing
low artificial noise levels to the desired receiver and higher noise in the direction of eavesdroppers [66–69]. This enables enhanced control over the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) (and
therefore decoding probability) observed at unauthorized nodes.
Although array synthesis is a mature topic, and there are many powerful techniques
available for synthesizing an individual pattern with desired properties, existing techniques
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Bob

Eve

Exclusion
Sector

Alice
Figure 5.1: Generic system model for secure array synthesis in line-of-sight (LOS) propagation
environment

do not provide a method to jointly synthesize signal and noise patterns to obtain optimal
secrecy. This chapter provides a solution for this outstanding problem of secure array synthesis for both LOS and multipath propagation environments. Sections 5.1- 5.4 present the
analysis and results for the LOS case, while Section 5.5 extends the analysis to a multipath
propagation environment.
5.1

Key Establishment in LOS Channels
Figure 5.1 shows a free-space communications scenario involving three nodes. Although

a two-dimensional (azimuth-only), single-carrier scenario is treated in this work, the method
is general and can be extended to three dimensions and wideband operation. Alice and Bob
are legitimate nodes who wish to communicate securely, while Eve is a passive eavesdropper
who attempts to receive and decode Alice’s and Bob’s transmissions. It is assumed that
all nodes know the relative Alice-Bob angle (φB ), whereas the relative Alice-Eve (φE ) is
unknown to Alice and Bob.
Consistent with traditional antenna array synthesis, a free-space or line-of-sight (LOS)
channel is assumed with Bob and Eve in the far-field of Alice’s array of NT elements. It
is sufficient to consider a single antenna at Bob and Eve, as arrays only change the SNR
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observed at these nodes and this SNR is already controlled by model parameters. The channels denoted hAB , hBA , and hAE are vectors that represent the complex baseband gains from
Alice’s array to Bob’s antenna, from Bob’s antenna to Alice’s array, and from Alice’s array to
Eve’s antenna, respectively. These channel vectors are scaled versions of the electromagnetic
steering vectors, or
hAB,i = hBA,i

(5.1)

= gi (φB ) exp[jk0 (ax,i cos φB + ay,i sin φB )],

(5.2)

hAE,i = gi (φE ) exp[jk0 (ax,i cos φE + ay,i sin φE )],

(5.3)

where k0 is the free-space wavenumber and gi (φ) and (ax,i , ay,i ) are respectively the field
radiation pattern and two-dimensional coordinate of the ith antenna in Alice’s array. It is
assumed that Eve knows all of the channel gains whereas Alice and Bob only know hAB and
hBA .
In this LOS environment, if Bob and Eve are close in angle, it will be difficult for
Alice to send different signals to the two based only on beamforming. Therefore, an exclusion
sector is defined, which is an angular extent φX ranging from φ1 to φ2 that is assumed to
be free of eavesdroppers. In some cases it may be possible to ensure that this sector is
eavesdropper-free by using visual information or restricting physical access. When this is
not possible, having an eavesdropper in the exclusion sector will compromise physical layer
security, meaning secrecy must rely on upper-layer protocols alone.
An informal problem statement for secure array synthesis is as follows: Find Alice’s
array signaling strategy to maximize the information exchanged between Alice and Bob while
minimizing the information given to an eavesdropper outside of the exclusion sector. This is
very similar to standard array synthesis where a typical objective is to maximize the gain in
the direction of the intended receiver (the main beam direction) while minimizing sidelobe
transmission outside of the main beam. While this informal problem statement is helpful, the
problem statement is more precisely formulated by considering two specific security metrics
mentioned below.
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Figure 5.2: Signal model for secrecy capacity.

5.1.1

Secrecy Capacity
Secrecy capacity is defined as the maximum amount of information that can be trans-

mitted between legitimate nodes without providing useful information to an eavesdropper.
Figure 5.2 depicts a detailed signal model that allows secrecy capacity to be defined for the
LOS scenario in Figure 5.1. In this model, for a single use of the channel Alice transmits the
complex baseband vector w that produces the signals ŷB and ŷE at Bob and Eve, respectively.
Mathematically, the received signals can be expressed as
ŷB = hTAB w +B ,
| {z }

(5.4)

ŷE = hTAE w +E ,
| {z }

(5.5)

yB

yE

where {·}T is a transpose and B and E represent noise modeled as zero-mean complex
Gaussian random variables with E {|B |2 } = σ02 . Since an eavesdropper’s receiver sensitivity
is generally unknown, this analysis uses the worst-case assumption that Eve’s receiver is
noiseless (E = 0).
Secrecy capacity CS for this model is the maximum mutual information that Alice
and Bob can attain, conditioned on Eve’s signal when Eve is at the worst-case position for
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security. This can be interpreted as the maximum secret information that Alice can transmit
to Bob over all possible angles for Eve outside of the exclusion sector, or
CS = max min I(w; ŷB |ŷE ),
φE

p(w)

(5.6)

where
I(w; ŷB |ŷE ) = H(ŷB |ŷE ) − H(ŷB |w, ŷE )

(5.7)

= H(ŷB , ŷE ) − H(ŷE ) − H(ŷB |w)

(5.8)

= H(ŷB , ŷE ) − H(ŷE ) − H(B ),

(5.9)

I(·; ·) is mutual information, p(w) is the probability density function (pdf) of the vector w,
and H(·) is differential entropy. Note that in the minimization in (5.6), the minimizing φE
can be a function of p(w), which means that all possible Eve angles must be considered
simultaneously in the minimization.
Assuming zero-mean complex Gaussian signaling, the pdf p(w) is completely deter
mined by its covariance matrix R = E wwH , where {·}H is a conjugate transpose. R is
constrained to satisfy Tr(AR) ≤ PT , where Tr(·) is trace, A is a coupling matrix [70], and
PT is the available transmit power. For uncoupled transmit antennas, the coupling matrix
gets simplified to A = I, where I is the identity matrix. The optimization problem in (5.6)
becomes
CS =

max

min I(w; ŷB |ŷE ),

R:Tr(AR)≤PT φE

I(w; ŷB |ŷE ) = log2

|RBE |
,
σE2 σ02
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(5.10)
(5.11)

where

RBE = E [ŷB , ŷE ]T [ŷB , ŷE ]∗


2
2
σB + σ0 σBE
,
=
∗
σBE
σE2

σB2 = E |yB |2 = hTAB Rh∗AB ,

σE2 = E |yE |2 = hTAE Rh∗AE ,
2
σBE
= E {yB yE∗ } = hTAB Rh∗AE ,

(5.12)
(5.13)
(5.14)
(5.15)

| · | is the determinant, and {·}∗ is the conjugate. Using (5.12), (5.11) becomes
(σB2 + σ02 )σE2 − |σBE |2
,
σE2 σ02



σB2
|σBE |2
= log2 1 + 2 1 − 2 2
.
σ0
σB σE
|
{z
}

I(w; ŷB |ŷE ) = log2

(5.16)
(5.17)

α(R,φE )

The optimization problem is therefore
CS =

max

min log2 [1 + α(R, φE )].

R:Tr(AR)≤PT φE

(5.18)

Since log2 (·) increases monotonically in its argument, the problem reduces to finding the
transmission strategy that maximizes α, or
αopt =

max

min α(R, φE ),

R:Tr(AR)≤PT φE

(5.19)

where CS = log2 (1 + αopt ).
5.1.2

Reciprocal Channel Key Establishment
Another way to communicate securely in a wireless environment is to encode trans-

missions using secret keys [35, 58]. To establish keys at the physical layer, Alice and Bob
can each transmit known training data from which the other can estimate the channel, and
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Figure 5.3: Signal model for reciprocal channel key establishment.

because of reciprocity the two estimates will differ only due to measurement errors. These
estimates can then be quantized to form the encryption key. In a fading environment, the radios can estimate multiple independent channel observations over time and thereby construct
long keys [59].
Unfortunately, the propagation channel does not fade in the LOS scenario, and therefore beamforming weights are used to generate random reciprocal channel observations, analogous to what was done with reconfigurable antennas in Chapter 4. Referring to Figure 5.3,
Alice uses a randomly generated weight vector w to transmit a publicly known scalar pilot
yA , resulting in received signals yB at Bob and yE at Eve. Next, Bob transmits a publicly
known scalar pilot yB0 , and Eve observes yE0 while Alice weights the received signals by the
vector w to obtain yA0 . By randomly changing w over time, different channel observations
can be realized.
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The effective end-to-end propagation channels created using this procedure are defined
as
hAB = yB /yA = hTAB w,

(5.20)

hBA = yA0 /yB0 = hTBA w = hAB ,

(5.21)

hBE = yE0 /yB0 ,

(5.22)

hAE = yE /yA = hTAE w.

(5.23)

Note that hBE is not random (has no information) and therefore will be ignored in the
subsequent analysis. It is assumed that the received signals are corrupted by zero-mean
complex Gaussian noise ξ with ξ ∈ [A, B, E], meaning that only estimates of the channels
are obtained, or
ĥAB = hAB + B ,

(5.24)

ĥBA = hBA + A ,

(5.25)

ĥAE = hAE + E .

(5.26)

The reciprocal fading channels between Alice and Bob can be used to generate secret
encryption keys. One secrecy metric for reciprocal channel key establishment is the number
of secure key bits given by
ISK = I(ĥAB ; ĥBA |ĥAE ).

(5.27)

Assuming that the random vector w is drawn from a zero-mean complex Gaussian distribution and independently realized for each measurement, (5.27) can be computed in closed
form as
ISK = log2

|R1 ||R2 |
,
σB2 |R3 |
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(5.28)

with
o
n
R1 = E [ĥAB , ĥAE ]T [ĥAB , ĥAE ]∗


2
2
σBE
σB + σ2
,
=
∗
2
2
σBE
σE + σ 3
n
o
R2 = E [ĥBA , ĥAE ]T [ĥBA , ĥAE ]∗


2
2
σB + σ1
σBE
,
=
∗
2
2
σBE
σE + σ 3
n
o
T
∗
R3 = E [ĥAB , ĥBA , ĥAE ] [ĥAB , ĥBA , ĥAE ]


σBE
σB2
σB2 + σ22




2
2
2
=
σB
σB + σ 1
σBE  ,


∗
∗
2
2
σBE
σBE
σE + σ 3

(5.29)


σB2 = E |hAB |2 = hTAB Rh∗AB ,

(5.35)


σE2 = E |hAE |2 = hTAE Rh∗AE ,

(5.36)

σBE = E {hAB h∗AE } = hTAB Rh∗AE ,

(5.37)

(5.30)
(5.31)
(5.32)
(5.33)

(5.34)

where

σ12 = E {|A |2 }, σ22 = E {|B |2 }, and σ33 = E {|E |2 }. Assuming equal estimation error variance
at Alice and Bob (σ12 = σ22 = σ02 ) and a noiseless receiver at Eve (E = 0), the determinants
in (5.28) can be expanded to obtain
1
[(σB2 + σ02 )σE2 − |σBE |2 ]2
σE2 σE2 (σ04 + 2σB2 σ02 ) − 2σ02 |σBE |2
[1 + α(R, φE )]2
= log2
,
1 + 2α(R, φE )

ISK = log2

(5.38)
(5.39)

where
σ2
α(R, φE ) = B2
σ0



|σBE |2
1− 2 2 ,
σB σE

82

(5.40)

which is precisely the same expression for α that was for secrecy capacity in (5.16). Note that
α(R, φE ) ≥ 0, and for this case it can be shown that ISK in (5.38) increases monotonically
in α. Therefore, only α needs to be maximized according to (5.19), after which the optimal
ISK is given by
ISK,opt = log2

[1 + αopt ]2
.
1 + 2αopt

(5.41)

It is remarkable that both secrecy capacity and the number of secure key bits depend
monotonically on α(R, φE ), allowing both problems to be solved using the same procedure.
This observation further motivates use of the general term secure array synthesis for the
solution.
5.2

Optimization Procedure
This section shows that the optimization problem in (5.19) can be written as a stan-

dard semi-definite program, indicating that the problem is convex and can be solved in an
efficient manner. One form of SDP solves the problem [71]

min cT x,
x

s.t. F(x) = F0 +

M
X

xm Fm ≥ 0,

(5.42)

m=1

where Γ ≥ 0 indicates that Γ is a positive semi-definite (PSD) matrix. To rewrite the secure
array synthesis problem in this form, it is first transformed to the constrained optimization

0
αopt
= max γ
γ,R

s.t.




(i) α0 (R, φE ) ≥ γ, ∀φE ∈
/ [φ1 , φ2 ]






 (ii) Tr(AR) ≤ PT

(5.43)



(iii) R ≥ 0






 (iv) γ ≥ 0,

0
where αopt
= σ02 αopt and α0 (R, φE ) = σ02 α(R, φE ). The following subsections focus on how to

cast the optimization into the general form of (5.42) and how each of the constraints (i)-(iv)
in (5.43) can be written as a PSD constraint.
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5.2.1

Optimization Variables
The unknown covariance matrix R is first parameterized in terms of a set of unknown

coefficients. This can be accomplished by expanding R using a matrix basis, or

R=

M
−1
X

rm R m .

(5.44)

m=1

A suitable set of basis matrices that span all possible positive semi-definite matrices is given
by the set S = SR ∪ SI , where
SR = {I + (Emn + Enm )/2}, m = 1, . . . , NT , n ≥ m

(5.45)

SI = {I + j(Emn − Enm )/2}, m = 1, . . . , NT , n > m,

(5.46)

and Emn is an elementary matrix with a 1 at position mn and zeros elsewhere. For NT = 2,
for example, the basis is

 
 

 
j
1
 2 0
1 0
1 2
1 2 



 .




S=
,
,
,
j
1
 0 1
−2 1 
1
0 2
2

(5.47)

With this formulation, the unknowns consist of the M − 1 values of rm and the value
of γ in (5.43). Therefore, the M × 1 vector of real optimization variables is
x = [r1 , r2 , . . . , rM −1 , γ]T .

(5.48)

The maximization in (5.43) can be cast into the minimization form of (5.42) using c =
[0 . . . 0 − 1]T .
5.2.2

Constraint (i): Minimum α Threshold
The constraint (i) is referred as a minimum α threshold, since its purpose is to ensure

that α is no lower than a certain minimum level for all possible Eve angles. One difficulty is
that (i) represents an infinite number of constraints, one at each possible value of φE outside
of the exclusion sector. This is replaced with a finite set of K constraints by uniformly
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sampling Eve’s possible angle at K values outside of the exclusion sector, which are denoted
by φE,k , where φE,k ∈
/ [φ1 , φ2 ]. This results in the set of constraints
σ02 α(R, φE,k ) ≥ γ,

k = 1, . . . , K.

(5.49)

Substituting the basis expansion (5.44) into (5.40),
σB2 σE2 − |σBE |2
,
σE2
hT Rh∗AB hTAE Rh∗AE − hTAB Rh∗AE hTAE Rh∗AB
= AB
,
hTAE Rh∗AE

σ02 α(R, φE ) =

uT rv(k)T r − z(k)T rz(k)H r
=
,
v(k)T r

(5.50)
(5.51)
(5.52)

where
um = hTAB Rm h∗AB ,

(5.53)

(k)
vm
= hAE (φE,k )T Rm hAE (φE,k )∗ ,

(5.54)

(k)
zm
= hTAB Rm hAE (φE,k )∗ .

(5.55)

The constraint (5.49) can therefore be written as
v(k)T r(uT r − γ) − (z(k)T r)(z(k)H r) ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , K,

(5.56)

which can be written as the determinant constraint
uT r − γ z(k)T r
z(k)H r v(k)T r
{z
}
|
(k)

FE
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≥ 0.

(5.57)

(k)

(k)

This is equivalent to the PSD constraint FE ≥ 0. The matrix FE can be expanded in
terms of the unknown optimization variables r and γ as

(k)

FE =

M
−1
X




um

(k)
zm

(k)∗

vm

zm

m=1

|
(k)

(k)



 rm + 

{z

}

(k)
FE,m

= FE,0 +

M
X



|

−1 0



γ
0 0
{z }

(5.58)

(k)

FE,M
(k)

xm FE,m ≥ 0,

(5.59)

m=1
(k)

where FE,0 is the zero matrix.
5.2.3

Constraint (ii): Power Constraint
Substituting the basis expansion (5.44) into the power constraint (ii) gives

Tr(AR) = Tr A

M
−1
X

!
rm Rm

m=1

=

M
−1
X

rm Tr(ARm ) ≤ PT ,

(5.60)

m=1

or
PT +
|{z}
FP,0

M
−1
X
m=1

rm [−Tr(ARm )] ≥ 0.
|
{z
}

(5.61)

FP,m

To write this in the form of (5.42), it is assumed that FP,M = 0.
5.2.4

Constraint (iii): PSD Constraint on R
Note that although each of the basis matrices is Hermitian and PSD, a linear combina-

tion of these matrices is still Hermitian but not necessarily PSD. To represent an admissible
solution, the transmit covariance must be PSD, or

R=

M
−1
X

rm Rm ≥ 0,

m=1
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(5.62)

which can be represented as a SDP constraint with the definitions

 0,
m = 0, m = M,
=
 R , 1 ≤ m ≤ M − 1.
m

FC,m

5.2.5

(5.63)

Constraint (iv): Non-negativity Constraint on γ
The simple constraint γ ≥ 0 can be written as the SDP constraint

Fγ,m

5.2.6


 0, 0 ≤ m ≤ M − 1,
=
 1,
m = M.

(5.64)

Solution Using MAXDET
Solutions to the SDP problem are found using the freely available MAXDET pack-

age [72] that solves the problem
min cT x + log2 |G(x)|−1
x

s.t. G(x) > 0, F(x) ≥ 0,

(5.65)

where F(x) has the form given in (5.42) and

G(x) = G0 +

M
X

xm Gm .

(5.66)

m=1

Since G is not needed, it is assumed that G0 = 1 and Gm = 0, M = 1, . . . , M .
While many of the constraint matrices are complex, MAXDET (and many other SDP
solvers) require that the constraint matrices be real. Fortunately, it can be shown that a
square complex matrix F satisfies
F ≥ 0 if and only if F ≥ 0,
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(5.67)

where


F,

Re {F} −Im {F}
Im {F}

Re {F}


.

(5.68)

Therefore, any complex-valued PSD constraint of the form given in (5.42) can be expressed
as the equivalent real-valued PSD constraint

F(x) = F0 +

M
X

xm Fm ≥ 0.

(5.69)

m=1

Given this, the K + 3 PSD constraints given in Sections 5.2.2 through 5.2.5 can be
combined into a single PSD constraint using the block diagonal matrix
Fm = diag

h

(1)

(2)

(K)

FE,m , FE,m , . . . , FE,m ,
FP,m , FC,m , Fγ,m

i

,

(5.70)

where diag(·) creates a matrix with the vector elements arranged on the main diagonal.
5.3

Signal/Noise Pattern Analysis
Once the optimal covariance matrix R has been found using the outlined secure array

synthesis procedure, it is desirable to visualize the solution. While one can simply plot the
secrecy metric CS or ISK with respect to Eve’s angle, such plots only indicate what security
is possible and give no insight into how it is achieved. An analysis that provides a more
constructive visualization is possible by decomposing the transmit power pattern into signal
and noise patterns.
Since Gaussian signaling is used, Eve’s receive quantity yE (or hAE ) for a fixed angle
φE can be decomposed into a sum of two terms as
yE = βC yB + yUC ,

(5.71)

where the first term is a Gaussian random variable that is perfectly correlated with Bob’s
signal (βC is a constant) and the second term yUC is a Gaussian random variable that is
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uncorrelated with Bob’s signal. While Eve can extract useful information from the signal
βC yB , the noise yUC has no useful information content and serves to confuse Eve. Therefore,
the following quantities are defined

PS = |βC |2 E |yB |2 ,

PN = E |yUC |2 ,

(5.72)
(5.73)

as the signal and noise power, respectively, observed by Eve. Plotting these quantities as
a function of Eve’s angle produces signal and noise patterns that provide a meaningful
visualization of the results.
To compute these quantities from the solution R obtained from the SDP optimization,
it is recognized that



E |yE |2 = σE2 = |βC |2 E |yB |2 + E |yUC |2 ,

(5.74)


E {yB yE∗ } = σBE = βC∗ E |yB |2 ,

(5.75)

∗
where E {yB yUC
} = 0 based on the definition of yUC . Comparing this to (5.12), it is simple

to solve (5.74) and (5.75) to obtain
PS = |σBE |2 /σB2 ,

(5.76)

PN = σE2 − |σBE |2 /σB2 .

(5.77)

It is important to emphasize that the signal/noise pattern interpretation given in
(5.76) and (5.77) provides the information required to compute CS and ISK . To see this α
can be expressed as,
σB2
α(R, φE ) = 2 2
σ0 σE



σE2

|σBE |2
−
σB2



σB2 PN
SNRBob
= 2
=
.
σ0 P S + P N
1 + SNREve
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(5.78)
(5.79)

5.4

Numerical Examples
This section illustrates application of the secure array synthesis method to some

practical examples. While a uniform linear array (ULA) and a uniform circular array (UCA)
of idealized patch antennas is used for these examples, the method is general and can be
used for any array topology. The inter-element spacing for all cases is assumed to be λ/2,
where λ is the free-space wavelength.
Since both ISK and CS have a monotonic relationship with respect to α, results have
focused on ISK in this analysis. Simulations are performed by varying the exclusion zone
(φX ), location of Bob (φB ) and Eve (φE ), and the number of transmit antennas at Alice
(NT ). In all simulations, angles for Eve outside of the exclusion zone are sampled uniformly
in 1◦ increments on φE ∈ [0, φ1 ] ∪ [φ1 , 180◦ ] for the ULA and φE ∈ [0, φ1 ] ∪ [φ2 , 360◦ ] for the
UCA. Also, the specific element pattern used for the patches is given by
2 sin ([k0 h/2] cos φ)
g(φ) =
cos
k0 h cos φ



k0 L
2


sin φ,

(5.80)

where h = 0.003λ and L = 0.5λ.
5.4.1

Suboptimal Approach for ULA
It is instructive to consider the security of a simple but suboptimal array synthesis

approach to illustrate the performance advantage enabled by the secure array synthesis
method. Specifically, for a ULA the Dolph-Chebyshev beam weights w are computed that
place maximum gain in the direction of Bob (angle φB ) for a specified sidelobe level LSL .
The pattern associated with w is referred as the signal pattern, as it is used to transmit
useful information to Bob. The singular value decomposition of w is computed as

w = UΛVH = [u1 U0 ] 

λ1 0
0

0



vH
1



VH
0


,

(5.81)

where u1 is a unit-length version of the vector w and the matrix U0 consists of unit-length,
mutually-orthogonal column vectors that are orthogonal to u1 . The vectors in U0 are then
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used to transmit noise to confuse Eve, with the resulting patterns again denoted as noise
patterns.
Given these beamforming weights, ζ is used to represent the fraction of transmit
power devoted to the signal pattern and ζ̄ to represent the fraction of power devoted to each
noise pattern so that ζ̄ = (1 − ζ)/(NT − 1). The covariance of the transmit signals is then
given by
R0 = UΣUH ,
where Σ = diag

(5.82)



ζ, ζ̄, ζ̄, . . . , ζ̄ . Finally, R0 is scaled to ensure satisfaction of the trans-

mit power constraint using
R = R0 /Tr(AR0 ).

(5.83)

Using this form of the covariance R, α in (5.40) can be computed as a function of LSL and
ζ. A brute-force search on ζ ∈ [0, 1] and LSL ∈ [0, 20] dB is used to determine the values of
ζ and LSL that maximize the minimum value of α for all values of φE outside the exclusion
sector.
5.4.2

Uniform Linear Array
The suboptimal procedure is first applied to a 10-element ULA at Alice with Bob at

φB = 90◦ (broadside to the ULA) and an exclusion sector around Bob of φX = 20◦ . The
optimization produces ζ = 0.723 and LSL = 15.6 dB for this scenario. Figure 5.4(a) plots
the signal (or Dolph-Chebyshev) pattern scaled by the signal power fraction ζ as well as the
linear combination of the equally-weighted noise patterns for the optimal parameter values.
As expected, Bob observes more signal than noise, while an eavesdropper outside of the
exclusion sector observes more noise than signal. Note that although the Dolph-Chebyshev
solution produces an array factor with equal sidelobes, the patch element radiation pattern
also shapes the signal and noise patterns. Figure 5.4(b) plots ISK for different values of ζ
and demonstrates how the optimal value of ζ = 0.723 maximizes the minimum value of ISK .
Figures 5.5(a) and (b) plot the performance achieved using the suboptimal and optimal approaches, respectively, as a function of Bob’s angle φB ranging from array endfire
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Figure 5.4: Suboptimal method for secure array synthesis employing a ULA with NT = 10,
φB = 90◦ , and φX = 10◦ : (a) power allocation to signal and noise patterns, (b) achieved ISK
performance for different power allocations.

3
2.5

(a) Sub−optimal

(b) Optimal

N =10
T

N =8

ISK (bits/use)

T

2

N =6
T

NT=4

1.5
1

0.5
0

20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
φB
φB

Figure 5.5: Performance of the (a) suboptimal and (b) optimal methods for a ULA at Alice
with φX = 10◦ . Performance is shown with respect to the number of antennas at Alice (NT )
and the transmit angle to Bob (φB ).

92

4
3.5

ISK (bits/use)

3
2.5

(a) Sub−optimal

(b) Optimal

N =10
T

NT=8
NT=6
NT=4

2
1.5
1
0.5
0

20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
φB
φB

Figure 5.6: Achieved ISK for a varying number of antennas in Alice’s ULA and different
transmit angles to Bob for φX = 20◦ : (a) optimal solution, (b) suboptimal solution.

(φB = 0◦ ) to broadside (φB = 90◦ ) for an exclusion sector of φX = 10◦ and different values
of NT .
The results for the suboptimal technique show that the worst-case value of ISK is reduced significantly when either Bob moves towards the endfire direction or the size of Alice’s
array is reduced because of the inferior beamforming capabilities of the ULA under these
conditions. While similar trends appear in the results for the optimal solution, the secure
array beamforming technique provides performance gains of nearly 50% for the smallest array when Bob is close to the broadside direction. Furthermore, the optimal beamforming
technique maintains higher values of ISK as Bob moves towards endfire.
Figure 5.6 repeats the analysis of Fig. 5.5 for a larger exclusion sector of φX = 20◦ . In
this case, the performance of the suboptimal and optimal solutions is similar for large array
sizes when Bob is at array broadside. However, as Bob moves toward array endfire, ISK falls
more rapidly for the suboptimal than for the optimal method. This highlights the fact that
the secure array synthesis approach has the potential to offer significant performance gains
over heuristic methods in a dynamic system where Bob’s position is variable.
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Figure 5.7: Comparison of radiated signal (PS ) and noise (PN ) for the (a) suboptimal and
(b) optimal approaches for a ULA at Alice with NT = 10 elements, φX = 10◦ , and φB = 90◦ .
The horizontal line is the minimum ISK outside of the exclusion sector.

It is instructive to use the signal/noise pattern analysis developed in Section 5.3 to
further understand the behavior of the two solutions. Figure 5.7 plots the number of secure
key bits, signal power, and noise power as a function of Eve’s angle φE for NT = 10, φX = 10◦ ,
and φB = 90◦ . The straight horizontal line in each plot shows the minimum value of ISK
obtained outside of the exclusion sector. At Bob’s position, both solutions place a peak in
the signal power and null in the noise power as expected, meaning that security would be
compromised if Eve were to reside in the exclusion sector.
Outside of the exclusion sector, a null in PS corresponds to a peak in ISK , which is
intuitive since no signal power reaches Eve for these angles. Conversely, a minimum value in
ISK coincides with the peak of each sidelobe in PS , with the noise pattern PN placing sufficient
noise power at these points to keep ISK at or above the minimum value (horizontal line).
It is observed that as compared to the optimal synthesis, the suboptimal synthesis directs
more signal energy outside of the exclusion sector, resulting in a higher minimum threshold.
Furthermore, the optimal method achieves an exact equal ripple response (the minima of

94

3
φ x = 40◦

ISK (bits/use)

2.5

φ x = 30◦
φ x = 20◦

2

φ x = 10◦

1.5
1

0.5
0

4

5

6

7

8

9

NT

10

11

12

13

14

Figure 5.8: ISK for a UCA at Alice as the size of the exclusion sector and the number of
antennas at Alice are varied.

ISK touch the ISK lower threshold), whereas the suboptimal approach only approximately
achieves this condition.
5.4.3

Uniform Circular Array
In order to demonstrate that the secure array synthesis can be applied to any array

topology, a UCA is considered in this section. Since the suboptimal approach is based
on Dolph-Chebyshev synthesis for a ULA, it is not considered here. Figure 5.8 plots the
average achieved minimum value of ISK as a function of NT for different values of φX , where
the average is taken over φB ∈ [90◦ , 180◦ ] with a step size of 1◦ . As expected, ISK increases
with the number of antennas and the exclusion sector angle.
Figure 5.9 plots ISK as a function of Bob’s location for φX = 40◦ and several values
of NT . These results show that the relative variation with φB is significant for small arrays
and less significant as NT increases. Finally, Figure 5.10 analyzes the optimal solution using
signal and noise patterns. Although the ISK ripple with angle is less regular for the UCA
than for the ULA, the synthesized array still ensures that ISK remains above a minimum
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directions to Bob for φX = 40◦ .

3

3
0

ISK

PN

2

−10
−15
−20

PS

1

Power(dB)

ISK (bits/use)

−5

−25
−30
0
0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

−35

φE
Figure 5.10: ISK , PS , and PN with respect to Eve’s location for a UCA at Alice with NT = 12
elements, φX = 40◦ , and φB = 270◦ .

96

Bob

Eve
d
y
z

x

Alice (ULA)
Figure 5.11: System diagram where Alice is equipped with a ULA of half-wave dipoles while
Eve and Bob each have a single half-wave dipole separated by distance d.

value. Within the exclusion sector, the behavior of the signal and noise patterns follow the
trends previously observed for the ULA.
5.5

Key Establishment in Static Multipath Channels
This section extends the method presented earlier to the case of a static multipath

channel. The channel is modeled by assuming a specific power angular spectrum (PAS) at
the nodes, and the optimization procedure maximizes the secure key generation rate for the
worst-case position of an eavesdropper.
5.5.1

Information Theoretic Analysis
Figure 5.11 shows the communication scenario, where Eve is close to Bob such that

there can be correlation between the channel from Alice to Bob and the channel from Alice
to Eve. Although the optimization method is general with respect to the array topology
and antenna types, this analysis concentrates on an illustrative example where all antennas
are half-wave dipoles and Alice’s array is a uniform linear array (ULA) with NT elements
and λ/2 inter-element spacing. For a multipath propagation environment, rather than a
separation angle it is more practical to define a minimum distance between between Bob
and Eve (dmin ), which is used in this analysis
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Consistent with the scenario in Section 5.1, it is assumed that Eve can be no closer
to Bob than dmin , since when Eve is too close, very little additional security is possible using
physical layer techniques. However, in the LOS scenario considered earlier, Alice knows the
channel that Eve would observe as a function of Eve’s position and therefore can optimize
the channel estimation to minimize ISK over all possible Eve locations. In contrast, in
this multipath channel Alice cannot know the channel to Eve for any of her positions, and
therefore Alice must perform her optimization based on the possible statistical correlation
2
between the Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-Eve channels. This means that σE2 , σBE
, and ISK are

random variables. Although there are many possible criteria for optimal security, this work
focuses on maximizing the minimum average value of α over all possible locations for Eve,
as this should lead to high ISK . The average value of α is defined as
σB2 E{σE2 } − E{|σBE |2 }
,
=
E{σE2 }σ02

αavg

(5.84)

where E{σE2 } = Tr{RR∗E }, E{|σBE |2 } = hTAB RR∗E Rh∗AB , R∗E = E{h∗AE hTAE }, and Tr{·} is the
trace.
The goal of this optimization is to find the value of R for a fixed hAB that maximizes
the minimum value of αavg over all possible locations of Eve satisfying d > dmin . To model the
correlation between the Alice-to-Bob and Alice-to-Eve channels the von Mises distribution
is used for the PAS at Alice and Bob/Eve. This PAS results in a closed form expression for
the spatial correlation [73] given by
ρ(∆) =

I0 (

p
κ2 − 4π 2 ∆2 + j4πκ cos(θp )∆)
,
I0 (κ)

(5.85)

where ∆ is the electrical distance between antennas, κ defines the angular distribution of
the multipath departures or arrivals, θp is the mean angle of arrival/departure (assumed to
be 0 in this analysis) and I0 is the zero-order modified Bessel function. Note that the von
Mises distribution is uniform for κ = 0 and becomes more Gaussian as κ increases. If both
transmit and receive correlation are known, the Kronecker model can be used to generate
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channels with the specified correlation according to




h
0
1/2
 AE  = R1/2
r H Rt ,
hAB

(5.86)

where Rt and Rr are NT × NT transmit and 2 × 2 receive correlation matrices, respectively,
0

and H is 2 × NT zero-mean complex Gaussian distributed random matrix. Note that the
separation between Alice’s antennas is fixed at λ/2 while the distance d between Eve’s
antenna and Bob’s antenna is variable.
The covariance matrix of stacked channels hAE and hAB can be expressed as


CS = 

CE

CEB

CBE

CB


.

(5.87)

Let µAB and µAE be the mean of the channels hAB and hAE respectively, then the mean and
covariance matrix of the multivariate normal distribution of hAE conditioned on a specific
observation of hAB can be computed using
µ̄AE = µAE + CEB C−1
B (h − µAB ),
C̄E = CE − CEB C−1
B CBE .

(5.88)
(5.89)

Finally the correlation matrix of the Alice to Eve channel can be expressed as RE = C̄E +
µ̄AE µ̄H
AE . Note that because of the propagation channel statistics, µAE = µAB = 0.
5.5.2

Analysis and Results
In order to understand the impact of transmit correlation, two different cases i.e.,

κ = 0 (low transmit correlation) and κ = 10 (high transmit correlation) are used at Alice.
At Bob/Eve it is assumed that κ = 2. Similar to the LOS case, semidefinite programming
(SDP) is used to find the optimal value of R when d > dmin . Figure 5.12 presents the
resulting value of ISK averaged over 1000 realizations of hAB as a function of dmin for both
high and low transmit correlation. As expected, an increase in the distance between Bob
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Figure 5.12: Average secure key rate for both low and high transmit correlation as a function
of minimum distance between Bob and Eve. The dashed lines corresponds to the sub-optimal
results.

and Eve increases ISK by reducing the receive correlation between hAB and hAE . The results
further show that high transmit correlation notably reduces ISK .
The results presented above are then compared to those from a suboptimal approach
in which signal (the secret key) is transmitted on the dominant dimension of the Aliceto-Bob channel and artificial noise is transmitted uniformly on the orthogonal complement
to the dominant dimension, where the dominant dimension and its orthogonal complement
are found using the singular value decomposition (SVD) i.e., hAB = UΛVH . The transmit
covariance is then formed according to R = UΛ0 UH , where Λ0 = diag(γ, γ 0 , . . . , γ 0 ), and γ 0 =
(1 − γ)/(Na − 1). The performance of the suboptimal approach is maximized by numerically
searching for the optimal value of γ for each realization of hAB . Figure 5.12 compares the
optimal solution found using SDP to that obtained from the suboptimal SVD approach. The
results show that the optimal approach significantly outperforms the suboptimal approach,
with the relative improvement increasing with the transmit correlation.
In order to better understand the results a signal/noise pattern analysis is performed
similar to the one presented in Section 5.3. However, since the propagation channel between
Alice and Eve is unknown, expectation is used to compute the signal and noise powers given
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Figure 5.13: Ratio of expected noise versus signal power at Eve for both low and high transmit
correlation cases as a function of minimum distance between Bob and Eve. The dashed lines
corresponds to the sub-optimal results.

by
0

PS = E{|σab |2 }/σa2 ,
0

PN = E{σb2 } − E{|σab |2 }/σa2 .
0

(5.90)
(5.91)

0

Figure 5.13 plots the ratio E{PN }/E{PS } for the same cases as depicted in Figure 5.12,
where the expectation is taken over 103 realizations of hAB . Results demonstrate that as
compared to the SDP solution noise power is significantly lower than signal power for the
suboptimal approach, which reduces the corresponding ISK . It is important to note that
for the suboptimal approach there is a significant difference between high and low transmit
correlation cases, which is depicted in ISK also. However the signaling strategy of the SDP
solution is almost the same.
Although the signal and noise pattern analysis identifies the differences between the
two approaches, it does not reveal differences in the structure of the covariance matrix.
For this purpose, the singular value decomposition of optimal and sub-optimal covariance
matrices is performed. The analysis reveals that for the optimal covariance matrix (Ropt )
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Figure 5.14: Singular values corresponding to the signal singular vector for the suboptimal
SVD case. For the optimal SDP solution, the smaller nonzero singular value is plotted .

only two non-zero singular values exist. On the other hand for the sub-optimal case (Rsopt ),
a full-rank covariance is used, with γ for the signal singular value and (1 − γ)/NT for the
noise singular values.
Figure 5.14 plots the singular value corresponding to the signal pattern for the suboptimal case. For the optimal case, it is not clear whether both of the singular values
contribute to the signal pattern or not. It is hypothesized that the subspace associated with
the smaller singular value is signal, due to its similarity with the suboptimal solution. Hence,
for illustration purpose the smaller non-zero singular value for Ropt is plotted. As expected
the results depict that for high transmit correlation there is less power on the signal pattern
and more on the noise patterns. Aside from this observation there is no apparent relation
between optimal and sub-optimal approaches.
Next, the correlation between the singular vectors of optimal and suboptimal covariance matrices is analyzed. For this purpose the dominant singular vector of hAB , i.e.,
V(:, 1), is projected on the eigenvectors (Q) of Ropt , which correspond to non-zero eigenvalues. Figure 5.15(a) plots the corresponding results for the high transmit correlation case,
where dashed lines refer to the projection on the dominant eigenvector of Ropt . It is inter-
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Figure 5.15: Orthogonal projection of dominant singular vector of channel hAB on the eigenvectors of optimal transmit covariance matrix Ropt which corresponds to non-zero eigenvalues:
(a) High transmit correlation. (b) Low transmit correlation.

esting to note that the orthogonality with respect to the non-dominant eigenvector of Ropt
reduces with distance which results in an increased difference in ISK . Figure 5.15(b) plots
the corresponding results for the low transmit correlation case with similar observations.
Although, it is hard to make a direct comparison between SVD of the covariance matrix
and the corresponding ISK but the results depict that the difference in signaling strategy in
terms of eigenvectors gives the optimal approach an significant advantage.
5.6

Chapter Summary
This work has posed the problem of secure array synthesis, which maximizes the

information transmitted to a desired location while minimizing the information leaked to
an eavesdropper at all possible locations outside a specified exclusion sector. Whereas traditional array synthesis focuses on a single pattern, secure array synthesis involves joint
optimization of two radiation patterns: one that transmits useful signal and another that
transmits artificial noise. The synthesis problem is solved by casting the problem into a form
suitable for existing semi-definite programming solvers. Comparison of results produced by
this optimization with those obtained from a suboptimal approach demonstrates that the
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optimization can significantly improve the realized secure key rate and secrecy capacity in
both LOS and realistic multipath scenarios.
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Chapter 6
Reconfigurable Over-the-Air Chamber
As wireless devices become more sophisticated, exploiting multiple polarizations and
multiple spatial degrees of freedom, the ability to characterize and assess relative performance in a repeatable way becomes increasingly difficult. Theoretically, the performance
of a multiport antenna system can be characterized separately from higher-level signal processing, modulation, and coding, but doing so in a device and algorithm-independent way is
very difficult.
In contrast to isolated antenna system characterization, over-the-air (OTA) testing
measures the performance of complete end-to-end communications in a controlled propagation environment. One method for OTA testing is demonstrated in [74–76], where the device
under test (DUT) is surrounded by an array of antennas in an anechoic chamber, allowing
several realistic multipath environments to be simulated in a repeatable way. A more economical and compact method is to use a mode stirred reverberation chamber [77, 78], also
allowing repeatable end-to-end testing of devices. While adding controllable delay lines to a
reverberation chamber increases control over the field emulation [79], the ability to control
the detailed propagation parameters for reverberation chambers is often limited.
Inspired by developments in reconfigurable antennas, the idea of a reconfigurable
OTA chamber (ROTAC) is explored in this chapter. The ROTAC can be seen as a device
whose walls are lined with antennas, a few of which may be attached to a channel emulator
and the balance of which are connected to reconfigurable impedances. This chapter presents
the design of a ROTAC and covers the simulations conducted to control the field statistics
inside the chamber. An experimental prototype of ROTAC is also built and presented to
indicate the degree of control over the synthesized channel spatial characteristics.
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Figure 6.1: Idealized two-dimensional chamber.

6.1

Idealized Chamber Topology
In this section, a circular two-dimensional chamber is simulated, but the idea can

be naturally extended to three-dimensional operation. The idealized chamber is depicted
in Figure 6.1, consisting of an outer wall whose surface is densely covered with radiating
antennas that are accessible at external ports. Exciting these ports generates waves that
radiate into the chamber, generating a desired wave field at the device under test (DUT).
Additionally, loads can be placed at the ports to absorb outgoing waves that are scattered
by the DUT.
In this work, the idealized chamber is efficiently modeled using the surface-based
method-of-moments framework presented in [80], which was applied for on-body propagation.
In this two-dimensional framework, the TMz fields in the chamber are completely determined
by Ez and ∂Ez /∂n on the outer boundary, where

Ez (x, y) =

M
X

am fm (x, y)

(6.1)

∂Ez (x, y)
=
bm fm (x, y),
∂n
m=1

(6.2)

m=1
M
X
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am and bm are unknown coefficients, fm (x, y) is a pulse basis function for the mth surface
element, and n̂ is the outward surface normal. Applying the moment method, a system of
equations for the chamber is found as
[I + Q]a = Sb,

(6.3)

where I is the identity matrix and expressions for the matrices Q and S are given in [80].
Next an equivalent-circuit model of this system is developed. Denoting tangential
electric and magnetic field intensities at the boundary as E0 and H0 , respectively, and
considering propagation at a single planar boundary reveals
E0 = Ez
H0 =

1 ∂Ez
jk0 η0 ∂n

,v

(6.4)

, i,

(6.5)

where k0 and η0 are the wavenumber and intrinsic impedance of free space, and v and i
denote equivalent voltage and current quantities. This result can be combined with (6.3) to
obtain,
[I + Q]−1 S(jk0 η0 ) i = v,
|
{z
}

(6.6)

Z

where Z is equivalent impedance matrix of the system. The matrix equation (6.6) allows
the chamber to be analyzed with equivalent-circuit techniques, where sources and loads can
be placed on the ports, and the current and voltage vectors i and v can be found. Interior
fields of the chamber can then be found by solving for a and b and applying [80]
Ez (x, y) = −Q(x, y)a + S(x, y)b.

(6.7)

Although in this work an idealized two-dimensional ROTAC is considered, where fields
on the boundary are directly excited at idealized ports, a practical implementation would be
possible by using conformal slots and/or patches on the wall of a three-dimensional structure,
which is presented in Section 6.4.
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Figure 6.2: Synthesis of a multipath wave field using the idealized two-dimensional chamber.

6.2

Electromagnetic Wave-field Synthesis
A straightforward but costly way to use the chamber is to excite each port of the

chamber with an independent source. To provide absorption of waves scattered by a DUT,
the sources should have an embedded impedance that absorbs signals flowing out the port.
In initial investigations, it was found found that terminating the ports with the free-space
wave impedance (377 Ω) provides reasonable absorption of outgoing waves.
Figure 6.2 illustrates how a multipath wave field can be almost exactly realized using
this technique. Here the chamber has a diameter of 4λ, where λ is the free space wavelength,
and the outer boundary is excited at 101 equally spaced ports, where each port is driven
with a voltage source having an internal impedance of 377 Ω. The desired wave field was
generated by superimposing 20 plane wave components, each having Rayleigh amplitude,
uniform phase, and uniform arrival angle. The source voltages at the ports are then specified
by computing the desired field in an inner 2λ diameter control region in the middle of
the chamber and inverting the equivalent-circuit model to find the required currents (and
therefore source voltages) at the boundary. As shown in the figure, the complicated incident
wave field is almost exactly reconstructed using this technique, which should be expected
based on Huygens’ principle.
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Figure 6.3: Chamber topology used for fading studies, where four ports are driven with active
sources and the remaining 24 ports are terminated with reconfigurable impedances.

Although the independent excitation of each port provides nearly arbitrary specification of incident fields in the chamber, a more cost-effective method is to use the chamber in a
manner similar to mode-stirred reverberation chambers. However, instead of using mechanical movement of scatterers in the chamber, reconfigurable loads are used at the boundary
ports to provide control over incident fields in the chamber, which is the idea of the ROTAC.
6.3

Synthesis of Channel Fading
This section illustrates how channel fading can be simulated using a simpler structure

than one where sources are placed on all ports. The same 4λ chamber is considered, but in
this case with only 32 ports, as depicted in Figure 6.3. The ROTAC is realized by driving
only four ports with active sources with constant amplitude and phase, while terminating
the other 28 ports with lossy reconfigurable elements (REs).

109

1

Data
Rayleigh

f(|E|)

0.75
0.5

0.25
0

f(6 E)

0.3

0

0.5

1

|E| 1.5

2

2.5

3

Data
Uniform

0.2
0.1
0

−3

−2

−1
6

0

E(rad)

1

2

3
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6.3.1

Generation of Rayleigh Fading
First the possibility of generating close to Rayleigh fading is considered by attempting

to make the fields in the chamber as random as possible. For this case, the voltages of the
√
active sources are chosen to be vs = [1 j − 1 − j]T , where j = −1, and a source impedance
of Rs,i = 377 Ω. The impedance of the ith RE is given by Zi = Ri + jXi , where a constant
resistance of 34 Ω is assumed and Xi ∼ U(−500 Ω, 500 Ω), where U(x1 , x2 ) denotes a uniform
distribution on the interval [x1 , x2 ]. The statistics of the fading in the chamber are analyzed
by storing the fields at 24 sample points separated by 0.04λ placed along the line L in
Figure 6.3.
A simulation of 104 random realizations is performed, where only the RE reactances
are randomly varied as described above. Figures 6.4 and 6.5 plot the amplitude/phase
probability density functions (pdfs) at the center sample point and the average correlation
coefficient along the line L, respectively. As can be seen, the statistics are close to an ideal
Rayleigh distribution. Further improvement and fitting of other distributions is possible by
more careful selection of the RE impedances, as described below.
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6.3.2

Fading Distribution Optimization
Next, how the parameters of the ROTAC port terminations can be controlled in order

to generate a particular channel fading environment inside the chamber is illustrated. In this
study, the optimization of the following parameters is considered:
1. The source excitation voltage vector vs , whose elements can be arbitrary complex
values (amplitude and phase) under the constraint 0 ≤ |vs,i | ≤ 1.
2. The constant resistance R0 of the RE impedances (Ri = R0 ), where the constraint
R0 ∈ [10, 145] Ω is assumed
3. The endpoints Xmin and Xmax of the uniform distribution used for the RE reactances,
where Xi ∼ U(Xmin , Xmax ). The bounds Xmin , Xmax ∈ [−2ηo , 2ηo ] and Xmin < Xmax
are assumed.
These parameters are collected into the 11-element vector
w = [|vTs | ∠vTs R0 Xmin Xmax ]T ,
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(6.8)

where optimization of the parameters is performed using a genetic algorithm (GA) using the
fitness function
F (w) = − max |fideal (xi ) − factual (xi |w)|2 ,
i

(6.9)

which minimizes the maximum squared error between the ideal and actual pdfs.
The GA starts with a randomization phase having an initial population of NI = 100
vectors, where each population vector has the format given in (6.8) and whose entries are
generated uniformly over the allowable range. The fitness function is computed for the initial
population, and the best NB = 10 vectors (those with the highest fitness) are retained.
The GA uses NB population vectors to generate NGA = 60 new population vectors using
mutations and cross-overs, where cross-overs are only possible within the same parameter
type (e.g. source voltages with source voltages), and the mutation probability is varied from
10% to 50%. The fitness function is evaluated for NGA population vectors and only the best
NB vectors are retained.
The steps in the previous paragraph are repeated NR = 100 times and the vector in
the final population having the highest fitness is declared to be the solution.
6.3.3

Rician Fading Example
As an example, synthesis of a Rician distribution is considered which is given by

  
x
(x2 + ν 2 )
xν
f (x|ν, σ) = 2 exp −
I0
,
2
σ
2σ
σ2

(6.10)

where I0 is the modified Bessel function of the first kind with order zero. In simulations, the
ROTAC parameters are optimized for a few different values of σ for a constant value of ν.
For fitness computations, the actual pdf for a single parameter vector w is obtained using
104 random realizations of the RE loads and computing a histogram.
Figure 6.6 plots the Rician probability distribution function (pdf) obtained using
(6.10) and the optimal solution from the GA, where the field was sampled at the center of
the chamber. As can be seen, a very close fit to the desired distribution can be obtained by
proper selection of the RE parameters.
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reactances, where in each case the distribution parameters are optimized for a specific value of
σ and ν.

6.3.4

Frequency Selective Fading
Previous sections have demonstrated that the ROTAC is capable of providing useful

fading distributions at a single frequency. However, due to the small size of the chamber,
one may question whether useful frequency-selective fading is possible. To provide frequency
selectivity, the chamber must reverberate, or in other words, the signal transmitted from
a source port must be involved in multiple bounces in the chamber before decaying to a
negligible level.
In order to analyze the frequency response characteristics of the field generated inside
the chamber, the structure is simulated from 280 to 320 MHz, where the chamber diameter
is 4 m (or 4λ at 300 MHz). The control parameters used in this case are the ones that
generated the Rayleigh amplitude distribution in the first example. Figure 6.7 plots the field
power in dB at the center of the chamber versus frequency for 4 random realizations of RE
reactances. As is evident, significant and diverse frequency selectivity is obtained for the
different random states.
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the field was sampled in the middle of the chamber.

6.3.5

Channel Delay Spread
One potential application of the ROTAC is to produce a certain delay spread of

multipath to simulate a specific wireless channel. Here the delay spread is obtained for a
single set of parameters, suggesting that delay-spread optimization is also possible using the
optimization techniques described previously. In this study 104 random realizations of RE
impedance states are used, where for each realization the frequency-dependent field Ez (f ) at
the center of the chamber and the associated time-domain response Ez (t) is computed using
an inverse Fourier transform. The mean power of the frequency- and time-domain responses
is computed by averaging |Ez (f )|2 and |Ez (t)|2 respectively over the 104 realizations.
Figure 6.8 plots the average frequency- and time-domain power over the 40 MHz
bandwidth. Both plots are normalized to obtain a maximum value of 1 (0 dB). The frequency
step size was chosen to be 0.25 MHz, which corresponds to a maximum unambiguous delay of
4 µs. Since 161 points are used to cover 40 MHz bandwidth, the time resolution is 25 ns. The
results demonstrate that the average power delivered to each frequency is fairly constant and
that the average delay spread is on the order of 150 ns. Note that the time for a propagating
wave to travel the width of the chamber (4 m) is 13 ns, which indicates a useful level of
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reverberation. As stated previously, more precise control of the delay spread is likely to be
possible using optimization techniques.
6.3.6

Directional Propagation Characteristics
Another potential application of the chamber is to generate multipath with a certain

power angle spectrum (PAS). For example, in many wireless propagation environments,
multipath tend to come in clusters, and one may desire to specify a PAS composed of one or
more such clusters. In order to explore the idea of generating different PAS profiles, fields
inside the chamber can be transformed from element space into wavenumber (or propagation
direction) space using the equation
Z
S(φ) =

E(x, y) exp[−jk0 (x cos φ + y sin φ)] dA,

(6.11)

A

where the two-dimensional integral is performed over the circular area A having a diameter
of λ/3 positioned at the center of the chamber.
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In this initial test, a desired directional profile is obtained by first generating a library
of solutions as follows. Source voltages and resistances are fixed as vs = [1 j − 1 − j]T
and Ri = 37 Ω, respectively. A set of 100 pairs of Xmin and Xmax are generated with
Xmin ∼ U(−2η0 , 2η0 ) and Xmax ∼ U(Xmin , 2η0 ). For each pair of Xmin and Xmax , 104
realizations of the loads are generated, where Xi ∼ U(Xmin , Xmax ). This process results in
a library of 106 random solutions. For a desired directional profile, the best 103 solutions
from the library that produce propagation in the desired directions are kept and replayed to
simulate fading with the desired directional bias.
Figure 6.9 illustrates that the library of solutions contains useful and diverse directional profiles. For each case sectors of desired receive power (dashed lines) are specified,
and the best 103 solutions that concentrate power to the sectors are averaged and plotted.
This simple example illustrates that even without detailed optimization, useful directional
properties of the wave field can be controlled.
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(a) Chamber side

(b) Single panel

(c) Chamber bottom

Figure 6.10: Prototype ROTAC: (a) Complete chamber from side, (b) a single chamber panel
hosting a 3 × 3 grid of dual polarized square patch antennas, (c) bottom view of the chamber
with one receive dipole placed in the middle of the chamber above the ground plane.

6.4

ROTAC Prototype
After the initial analysis using simulations, a functional prototype ROTAC was built

to experimentally confirm that the technique has the potential to provide flexible, low-cost
OTA testing. Figure 6.10(a) depicts the initial prototype ROTAC, which is a cube formed
from five panels that are 11 inches square. Each individual panel, an example of which is
shown in Figure 6.10(b), hosts a 3 × 3 grid of dual-port, dual-polarization patch elements
separated by λ/2, where λ is the free space wavelength. The cube is placed on a ground
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Figure 6.11: S-parameters of a single fabricated patch antenna used in the prototype ROTAC.

plane, as shown in Figure 6.10(c), which is perforated with a grid of small holes that allow
cable access to a DUT within the chamber.
Figure 6.11 shows the individual dual-polarized patch antenna used on the ROTAC
panels. The patch is fabricated on 60 mil Taconic RF substrate with a relative permittivity
of 3.5. Quarter-wave transformers are used on each feeding transmission line to match the
antenna input impedance to 50 Ω. Figure 6.11 also plots the reflection coefficients (S11 and
S22 ) and cross coupling coefficient (S12 ) of the fabricated antenna. The antenna is resonant
near 2.53 GHz, with a 3 dB bandwidth of approximately 80 MHz. Cross-coupling between
the two feed ports is less than −30 dB. The 18 ports on each of the five panels provide a total
of 90 ports that can be connected either to RF sources (feed ports) or REs (reconfigurable
ports). The RE used, which is similar to that reported in Section 2.1.3, enables a phase
tuning range of 200◦ with a maximum power loss of 3 dB.
6.4.1

Fading Statistics Control
This section focuses on the control of fading statistics inside the ROTAC. In order to

acquire initial measurements, the vertical polarization port of the center antenna on each of
the four side panels is fed while the vertical polarization ports of the antennas at the four
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Figure 6.12: Histograms of the phase and amplitude of the field sampled at the DUT antenna
in the ROTAC compared to uniform phase and Rayleigh amplitude distributions.

corners of these side panels are loaded with REs as shown in Figure 6.10(a). Ports connected
neither to sources nor to REs are left unterminated (open circuit). The field is measured
using a monopole in the middle of the chamber above the ground plane, with the antenna
connected to the receiver by a cable through the ground plane as shown in Figure 6.10(c)
Measurements were performed using an 8 × 8 multiple-input multiple-output channel
sounder, where four sounder transmit ports were connected to the four ROTAC feed antennas
and a single sounder receive port was connected to the monopole. The transmit RF signal
consisted of four tones separated by 5 MHz and centered at 2.53 GHz. Because the sounder
activates one transmit port at a time, it measures the transfer function hi [n] from the ith
feed port to the receive port, where n is the frequency bin index. Measurements of the four
transfer functions, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, were captured for 106 different combinations of random RE
states (bias voltages). If the phase of the signal transmitted from the ith feed port is φi , the
realized channel response from the transmitter to the DUT at the nth frequency is computed
as
hR [n] =

NF
X

hi [n]ejφi ,

i=1

where NF is the number of feed ports.
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Figure 6.13: Amplitude pdfs of the field sampled at the DUT antenna in the ROTAC compared to different Rician distributions, where σ and v control the Rician statistics.

Based on the measured data and (6.12), a brute-force optimization is performed in
which 104 random phase combinations are realized. Next, the single phase combination
is selected that produces channel responses whose magnitude and phase distributions are
approximately Rayleigh and uniform, respectively. Figure 6.12 shows the realized field histograms along with the target amplitude and phase distributions. To achieve Rician fading,
the phases are fixed at φi = 0 and select a subset of the RE states that achieves the desired
field amplitude distributions. Figure 6.13 shows the pdfs for these results for different target Rician distributions, where the Rician parameters are presented in (6.10). These results
demonstrate that the ROTAC is capable of providing a range of different fading distributions.
6.4.2

Power Angular Spectrum Control
Next, the degree of control over the synthesized channel spatial characteristics is

explored. The vertical polarization port of eight antennas on each panel are terminated
with an RE whose bias voltage is provided by an FPGA-controlled D/A, for a total of 40
independently-controlled terminations. One antenna on each of the four side panels is then
120

Figure 6.14: Prototype ROTAC for PAS Measurements: (a) Side view of the complete
chamber showing representative feed and RE ports; (b) Bottom view of the chamber showing
the RF cables that connect to an eight-element circular array of receiving monopole antennas.

fed by an independently-controlled source, with the feed antenna selected according to the
following cases: Case 1 – the vertical polarization port at each panel center; Case 2 – the
vertical polarization port at the panel lower right corner; Case 3 – the horizontal polarization
port at the panel lower right corner. Cases 2 and 3 are illustrated in Figure 6.14(a). Note
that all remaining ports remain unterminated (open circuit). To measure the fields inside
the chamber, an array of eight monopole antennas arranged in a circle of radius λ/2 is placed
at the center of the chamber, with each monopole connected to the receiver using RF cables
as shown in Figure 6.14(b).
Let ĥk` [n] represent the transfer coefficient from the `th transmit to the kth receive
antenna at the nth discrete frequency bin for one set of RE bias voltages (state). The signal
at the kth receive antenna for this frequency is

hk [n] =

NF
X

a` ejθ` ĥk` [n],

(6.13)

`=1

where a` ejθ` is the complex gain applied to the `th feed port signal and normalized such that
P
4
` a` = 1. The measurement record includes channels for 10 different RE states.
For each RE state, a randomly-chosen set of 104 complex gains a` ejθ` is applied
followed by the use of a Bartlett beamformer on the circular array to estimate the PAS. For
121

0 (a)
−5
−10
Power (dB)

−15
−20
0 (b)
−5
−10
−15
−20
0

40

80

120

160
200
Azimuth Angle

240

280

320

360

Figure 6.15: Power incident on the DUT as a function of azimuth arrival angle for sources
on the vertical polarization port at the center of each face (Case 1): (a) Single RE state; (b)
Average over 50 RE states.

each gain combination, the peak of the the PAS is computed and the sidelobe level (SLL)
is defined as the peak power observed at angles beyond the array beamwidth, which is the
angular range between PAS first nulls for an incident plane wave. For each gain combination,
the SLL for each state as well as the SLL averaged over the 50 states that achieve the lowest
SLL for that gain is stored.
Figures 6.15-6.17 plot the azimuth PAS for Cases 1-3. In each case, the solid and
dashed lines depict the cases with the lowest and highest SLL, respectively. Furthermore, the
top and bottom plots show SLL results for each state and averaged over the best 50 states,
respectively. The results demonstrate that the SLL depends on the peak angle of arrival.
Furthermore, while the SLL is higher for the averaged results, the difference is generally
small, meaning that a single gain combination can be effective for multiple different RE
states. The results for different feed ports show that the worst case SLL is improved by
moving the feed location to the corner and transmitting on the horizontal polarization. The
most important observation is that the ROTAC offers considerable control over the PAS.
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Figure 6.16: Power incident on the DUT as a function of azimuth arrival angle for sources
on the vertical polarization port at the lower right corner of each face (Case 2): (a) Single RE
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Figure 6.17: Power incident on the DUT as a function of azimuth arrival angle for sources
on the horizontal polarization port at the lower right corner of each face (Case 3): (a) Single
RE state; (b) Average over 50 RE states.
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6.5

Chapter Summary
This work has explored the idea of an reconfigurable OTA chamber (ROTAC) whose

purpose is to allow realistic OTA testing of wireless devices in a cost effective way. The
initial study of an idealized two dimensional chamber suggests that such chambers may
allow fading distribution, spatial correlation, frequency selectivity, and directional bias of
different multipath channels to be simulated. To authenticate simulations, an experimental
prototype ROTAC was also built. Results demonstrate that it can be used to generate
Rayleigh and Rician fading statistics at the DUT by controlling the impedance of the REs
along with the phase shift applied to the signal from each transmit port. Furthermore, the
power angular spectrum at a DUT can be controlled by optimizing the feed locations and
gains.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This dissertation provides a comprehensive analysis of reconfigurable antennas for
various communication applications using both simulations and direct measurements. Results have not only highlighted the performance advantage achieved using reconfigurable
antennas, but also the practical limitations associated with their implementation..
7.1

Summary
In order to efficiently analyze RECAP structures, a hybrid approach was developed

in Chapter 2 that uses full-wave simulations combined with the network analysis of the
structure. Furthermore an efficient implementation of a genetic algorithm (GA) was done in
order to optimize the structure for different applications and study the detailed dependence
of performance on fixed complexity.
MIMO capacity improvements possible with a parasitic RECAP structure for different
propagation scenarios were studied in detail in Chapter 3. Results were presented for both
2×2 and 4×4 MIMO systems in both wide band and narrow band optimization scenarios.
Both noise-limited as well as interference-limited cases were considered with varying level
of interference under three different realistic power constraints: average receive signal-tonoise ratio, effective isotropic radiated power (EIRP), and fixed total transmit power. For
the practical EIRP constraint, results demonstrated that a compact 9 × 9 MIMO RECAP
(1λ×1λ) provides 30%-50% capacity improvement for a single link. It was also found that
RECAPs are even more beneficial in interference-limited and multiuser scenarios, where
capacity was increased by 50% to 800% depending on the severity of the interference,
The results from simulations were verified by measurements in both LOS and nonLOS indoor environments. Measurements were performed by using a 5×5 parasitic RECAP
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at the receiver for a bandwidth of 70 MHz centered at 2.55 GHz. For RECAP optimization
a simple genetic algorithm was implemented and its performance was compared with that
of a random search. Measurements confirm that a large increase in capacity is possible,
particularly when there is high interference present. Also, this work highlighted the need
of an efficient optimization algorithm, as it is not possible to find a good solution by a
random search. Overall the results indicate that RECAPs are an attractive solution for
future wireless systems employing aggressive spectral reuse
Chapter 4 used simulations and experimental measurements to characterize the impact of reconfigurable antenna complexity on the performance of key establishment in different static propagation environments and in the presence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper.
Analysis was performed using a 5 × 5 parasitic RECAP confined to an area of 1λ×1λ. Since
the artificial channel fluctuations created by RECAP structures are not necessarily Gaussian, a numerical procedure for computing available and secure key bits was developed that
is applicable to channels with arbitrary fading.
Numerical examples of the parasitic RECAP with varying levels of complexity illustrated that reconfigurable antennas can significantly enhance the security, even when the
eavesdropper antennas are adjacent to or surround one of the legitimate nodes. Furthermore
a close agreement between simulations and measurements was found. The results demonstrated that increasing the number of reconfigurable parasitic elements notably increases the
achieved performance, where two states per element maximize the number of bits available
per RECAP state.
Chapter 5 explored optimal array beamforming for secure communication in the presence of a passive eavesdropper for both LOS and static multipath propagation environments.
The problem was cast as a convex optimization problem, that was solved using semi-definite
programming. For the LOS environment, a suboptimal pattern synthesis approach was also
presented which makes use of Dolph-Chebyshev pattern synthesis. Numerical examples for a
uniform linear array revealed that although in some cases the performance of the suboptimal
approach was similar to that achieved with the optimal secure array synthesis, in other cases
the performance of the suboptimal approach was dramatically inferior. Application of the
method to a uniform circular array demonstrated the generality of the secure array synthesis
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approach. The analysis was further extended to a static multipath environment, where the
average key rate performance was optimized. A comparison with the suboptimal approach
based on the singular value decomposition of the propagation channel revealed a significant
performance advantage.
Chapter 6 presented the idea of a reconfigurable over-the-air chamber (ROTAC) for
over-the-air (OTA) testing in a compact and cost-effective way. The ROTAC makes use of
reconfigurable antennas on the walls of a metal chamber to vary field statistics inside the
chamber. Analysis was performed using an idealized two-dimensional chamber in simulations
as well as by building an experimental ROTAC prototype. Results demonstrated that by
proper control of the reconfigurable elements, realistic multipath propagation conditions can
be generated on the device under test.
7.2

Future Work
There are several possible directions for future research related to the topics presented

in this dissertation. A few of the ideas are presented below:
• This work has analyzed a parasitic RECAP by considering the practical aspects like
losses, phase tunability and finite bandwidth associated with reconfigurable elements
(REs). In contrast to a parasitic array, RE losses can have a significant impact on the
performance of a planar RECAP structure. Hence, design and analysis of an RE for
a planar RECAP that can provide a significant phase tunability with lower loss is an
interesting problem.
• Non-parasitic RECAP that employ variable interconnection and planar RECAP structures may provide a more practical solution and could be studied in depth. Also, a
prototype of a planar RECAP could be built and used in propagation measurements
to explore its performance advantage compared to the parasitic RECAP.
• A global optimization based method was developed to analyze MIMO capacity enhancement using parasitic RECAPs. It is of interest to study what radiation patterns
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give high capacity and whether or not the pattern can be directly controlled to enhance capacity. Also, the development of more efficient direct optimization methods
for RECAPs still requires significant work.
• For physical layer security, the states of the reconfigurable elements were changed
randomly according to a uniform distribution to generate artificial fading in the propagation channel. An interesting open problem is to find the distribution that optimizes
security, Perhaps this can be solved by extending the work on secure pattern synthesis,
where ‘ideal’ reconfigurable antennas are replaced with more practical elements.
• The analysis presented in Chapter 5 for secure pattern synthesis assumed Gaussian
signaling. However, the Gaussian assumption may not hold for a practical system
employing other modulation schemes like BPSK or QPSK. Hence, a practical method
needs to be developed that can use the developments in Chapter 5 for arbitrary modulation schemes. Also, the impact of estimation error for Bob’s location is ignored,
which may have a significant impact based on the uncertainty in the estimate. Lastly,
an analysis of complexity (in terms of number of elements) and computational time of
semi-definite programming will highlight the practicality of the proposed method for
a real-time implementation.
• A random search was used to analyze the performance of the ROTAC prototype in
Chapter 6. More efficient real-time optimization algorithms for the ROTAC need
to be developed. Also, direct measurement demonstrated the promise of the ROTAC
concept, but hid the mechanisms governing ROTAC operation. A detailed and realistic
simulation of the ROTAC prototype could be developed, which would reveal these
mechanisms, providing a better understanding of the proposed ROTAC concept.
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